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The Search Interest in Contract
Joshua A. T. Fairfield*
ABSTRACT: Parties often do not negotiate for contract terms. Instead,
parties search for the products, terms, and contractual counterparties they
desire. The traditional negotiation-centered view of contract leads courts to
try to determine the meaning of the parties where no meaning was negotiated
and to waste time determining the benefits of bargains that were never
struck. Further, while courts have ample tools to validate specifically
negotiated contract terms, they lack the tools to respond to searched-for terms.
Although the law and literature have long recognized that there is a
disconnect between the legal fictions of negotiation and the reality of
contracting practice, no theory has emerged to replace fictional negotiation.
Therefore, this Article develops a new search-oriented theory of contract and
shows that search theory can explain contracting behavior where the fictions
of negotiation fail. This Article then applies search theory to the common
law of contract, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the growing world of
Internet searches and electronic contracting.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Contract law suffers from misplaced focus. Currently, the magical
moment in contract law is the "meeting of the minds," the moment at which
negotiated contract terms are solidified in the minds of all contracting
parties. The model of contract with which legal scholars are most familiar
imagines parties meticulously negotiating contract provisions with
counterparties.
This meeting of the minds, or "negotiation model," is not how most
people (except large corporations) engage in contracting. Rarely today do
parties negotiate terms with a specific counterparty. Rather, prospective
purchasers search for counterparties that offer the set of contract terms they
desire. For example, prospective purchasers generally do not negotiate for
the price of computers or television sets. Instead, inquiring buyers might go
to a website to compare prices, guarantees, and warranty terms already on
offer. (Even the offline shopper will find that he spends more time
searching than negotiating-the cost of shoe leather in comparison
shopping is higher than the amount of time spent negotiating with store
proprietors.) The primary cost of contracting is not in negotiating the fine
details of the contract with the store; the cost of contracting is finding a
store that sells the desired product coupled with the desired contract.
An example may help make the issue concrete. Suppose that you desire
a house with two fireplaces. You go to a contractor and, although the
standard house that the contractor builds has only one fireplace, you and
she sit down and begin to negotiate. You draft a building contract that,
among its many provisions, has a clause indicating that the home will have
two fireplaces. You accept significant price increases and building schedule
delays in order to get what you want. You suffer opportunity costs because
you have decided to negotiate with this contractor instead of going
elsewhere. Both you and the contractor initial the "two fireplace" clause,
indicating that you have specifically negotiated this clause. You then go on a
world tour to publicize your new book, and the house is built while you are
gone. You come back and find that the builder has nearly finished the house
but that he has installed only one fireplace. Incensed, you take the issue to a
court, with confidence that the court will have the tools to enforce your
specifically negotiated provision.
Negotiation for those two fireplaces is not your only option. Instead of
laboriously negotiating for the contract term stipulating two fireplaces,
suppose you engage in a long and hard search for the home you desire. You
search www.realtor.com, read listings in newspapers, hire a realtor to show
you around, and engage in countless home visits. You are on a mission to
find that perfect house with two fireplaces. Finally, you locate a house on the
Web that seems to fit the bill. The listing clearly describes the house as
having two fireplaces. Although you are on your book tour, the pictures and
1240 [2007]
THE SEARCH INTEREST IN CONTRACT
descriptions seem just perfect. You sign, but once you see the house, again,
only one fireplace has been installed. Back to court we go.
In the first case, a court would have ample tools provided by legal
reasoning and precedent to give the negotiated and initialed clause special
force and effect.' The court might consider the clause the "heart of the
bargain" or might enforce the negotiated provision as against a non-
negotiated provision that might seem to contradict it.2 The court may even
order specific performance under limited circumstances. What is important
is that courts have the tools to recognize the costs involved in the
negotiation of the provision and have the legal tools to remedy the harm.
But this is not true in the second case. Courts lack the tools to give a
"searched for" contract term the same force as a "negotiated" clause. Courts
have no lens through which to view the search interest in contract. Without
a framework for analyzing this interest, disparities between searched-for and
negotiated contractual provisions will persist.'
Why does it matter if courts focus on negotiation costs while parties
incur search costs? Courts spend judicial resources interpreting what parties
"meant" in contracts where "meaning" was not negotiated (and,
overwhelmingly, where the contract was not even read at all). Courts
develop remedies giving force to parties' negotiated preferences where no
negotiation occurred at all. The effect is that courts currently inefficiently
subsidize negotiation and cause parties to forego otherwise valuable
searches.
Thus, the basic proposal of this Article is this: Courts should have
interpretive rules and remedies that permit them to respond to search costs
in contracting. There is a continuum of legitimate contracting costs,
running from negotiation costs through search costs. Courts have the tools
to respond to the negotiation end of the continuum; however, they lack
tools to respond to the search end. This Article does not, therefore, advocate
1. See, e.g., Isler v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp., 749 F.2d 22, 23 (10th Cir. 1984) (upholding a
bargained-for provision to limit liability, and noting that "[t]he very notion of contract is the
consensual formation of relationships with bargained-for duties"); see also Caribbean Ins. Servs.,
Inc. v. Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co., 715 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1983) (enforcing a successfully-
bargained-for express right to early trial).
2. See generally Cumberland Valley Coop. Ass'n v. Martin, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th 10, 12 (Ct.
Com. P1. Pa. 1991) (ordering judgment against a debtor with the rate of interest agreed to by
the parties rather than at the legal interest rate because the former rate was expressly bargained
for).
3. As discussed in Part II.D. below, the current literature on contract standardization
focuses on the value of boilerplate in saving negotiation and drafting costs and does not focus
on search. See generally Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81
VA. L. REv. 757 (1995); Michael Klausner & Marcel Kahan, Path Dependence in Corporate
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior, and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996)
[hereinafter, Klausner & Kahan, Path Dependence]; Michael Klausner & Marcel Kahan,
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L.
REV. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Klausner & Kahan, Standardization].
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changing the law. Rather, the goal of this paper is to delineate a value-the
value of facilitating searches-that is already present in the law of contract
but that courts insufficiently recognize. Once interpretive rules and
remedies compensate for search costs of contracting, rather than only
negotiation costs, the resolution of contractual disputes will more
appropriately mirror actual contracting practice.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. The first discusses search costs
generally and the literature of search. The second Part demonstrates that
the search interest in contract is present in the common law and applicable
statutes but that courts do not cogently recognize or sufficiently value this
interest. The third Part examines the implications of a search-centered
theory of contract on court remedies and interpretive rules. The fourth Part
applies a search-centered theory of contract to make sense of two previously
confusing areas of law: electronic contracting and sales law, as set forth in
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
II. THE THEORY OF SEARCH
Most costs in modern contracting do not involve negotiating an
individualized agreement. 4 Rather, most modern contracting costs involve
the searcher finding someone she is willing to contract with in the first
place. 5 For example, if a party wishes to buy a computer, she generally does
not engage in a prolonged negotiation of terms with the computer seller.
Instead, she searches (often on the Internet) for a list of computer sellers
and selects one that offers the mix of contractual terms and technological
features that she desires. The buyer spends time on the search, not
negotiation.6 The next section defines and provides examples of such search
costs.
A. A TAXONOMY OF SEARCH
A search cost is a transaction cost. "Transaction cost" is a shotgun term
used by the economically minded to describe those costs that may impede or
4. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REv. 683, 770-71 (1993); R. Ted Cruz &JeffreyJ. Hinck, Not My
Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 635, 641 (1996) (citing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 280-82 (1987)) (noting that the greatest contracting cost in
purchasing an expensive item is not the cost of drafting an express clause but rather the cost of
obtaining information); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971) (observing the widespread use of standard-
form contracts as opposed to negotiated ones).
5. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70
U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1208 (2003).
6. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 4, at 657-64.
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stop a gainful trade from taking place.7 Since both negotiation and search
costs are transaction costs, they commonly both fall or rise together. But
there are also situations in which there is a tradeoff between the two: If a
prospective contracting party does not wish to engage in lengthy and costly
negotiations with a specific counterparty, her alternative is to search out a
party more amenable to the deal she wants. Thus, negotiation costs can be
reduced by engaging in less costly searches. Likewise, if finding a
counterparty is expensive, but counterparties are open to a wide range of
contract terms, negotiation costs could conceivably be lower than search
costs.
This cost tradeoff has evolved in favor of exchanging high negotiation
costs for low search costs. While search costs have fallen, as a function of
networked computer systems,8 negotiation costs have either remained the
same or have risen as a function of an increased need to specify every
contingency when contracting.9 As searching becomes faster and easier, the
trend of search as a replacement for negotiation will continue. Yet
traditional contract doctrines continue to systematically undervalue searchesas cmpaed o eqivaent • • 10
as compared to equivalent negotiations. The result is that some courts are
inefficiently subsidizing the negotiation models of contract. If courts enforce
terms for which they have indicia of negotiation but do not have the tools to
do the same for searched terms, parties will inefficiently avoid cheaper
searches because of worries about how the court will react. And, even when
courts do recognize the value of the search interest in contract, they use
inexact language to articulate their reasoning.
This section first discusses what searches are. A "search," like a
"negotiation," is an abstract term that derives meaning from how people use
7. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations, 122 U.
PA. L. REv. 1439, 1443 (1974) ("[T]he transaction cost approach attempts to identify a set of
market or transactional factors which together with a related set of human factors explain the
circumstances under which complex contracts involving contingent claims will be costly to
write, execute, and enforce."). See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The
Governance of Contractual Relations, 22J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
8. See Avery Wiener Katz, Is Electronic Contracting Different? Contract Law in the
Information Age 16 (Nov. 23, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Iowa Law
Review), available at http://www.columbia.edu/-ak472/papers/Electronic%20Contracting.pdf.
Katz notes:
The electronic setting is also likely to mitigate informational limitations at the
point where parties negotiate and enter into contracts. It is easier and cheaper to
look into the details of contractual language when one has access to electronic text
and can use software search algorithms to discover critical or difficult terms.
Id.
9. This trend is exacerbated by statutes that offer default rules that parties must draft
around. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. See infra Part III.B.1.
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it. 12 But that does not mean that differentiation between concepts is not
useful, even as we admit that complete separation of the concepts is not
possible.'" And, if we can identify a cost as a search cost, we might help
parties that are insufficiently aware of cost-savings that might be available
through search rather than negotiation. Similarly, we might help courts with
vague intuitions that something is incomplete in current contracts-costs
analysis and better describe transaction costs within contracts.
1. Location of Search Costs Within the Larger
Universe of Transaction Costs
It may be useful to think of the old conceptual standby, the Venn
diagram. Some transaction costs are clearly search costs, some are
negotiation costs, and some are not clearly related to search or negotiation
at all. For example, one might construe drafting costs as a kind of
information cost leading parties to use standardized contracts. 4 Clearly
drafted or previously vetted language does indeed lower search costs when
reused-the drafting and vetting reduces uncertainty about what the terms
mean or what courts will do with them, while increasing certainty that the
parties have found the deal they sought.15 Standardized contract language
may also lower negotiation costs because the drafter is able to signal, by the
16use of standardized language, that she does not seek any unfair advantage.
Thus, drafting costs are part of both search and negotiation costs.
Searches can be both positive and negative. Positive searches are
searches for parties that offer goods or land with desired features, services,
or contracts with desired terms." Negative searches are searches to ensure
the absence of a feature or contractual term. So, for example, a prospective
purchaser might search for a house with a rose garden in the back-a
positive search. Having found such a house, the party might check the roof
to make sure that it does not leak-a negative search. Or, from the contract
perspective, a prospective purchaser might make a positive search for a
given price term; conversely, she might make a negative search to ensure the
contract does not have an invidious provision that she wishes to avoid. Often
courts and scholars characterize a negative search as being more expensive
12. See SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE: AN ELEMENTARY
EXPOSITION 55-113 (1982). Kripke notes, "There can be no such thing as meaning anything by
any word." Id. at 55.
13. See id. at 55-62 (discussing the meaning of language).
14. Klausner & Kahan, Standardization, supra note 3, at 720.
15. See id. (noting the costs of creating new terms).
16. See id. at 729 (noting that using standard terms informs performance expectations).
17. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld, Spiders and Crawlers and Bots, Oh My: The Economic
Efficiency and Public Policy of Online Contracts That Restrict Data Collection, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
3, 6; Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The
Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1400-01 (1983).
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than a positive search.' 8 However, both positive and negative searches bear
significantly on contracting behavior, as discussed further below.
2. Unilateral and Bilateral Costs
Searches often are conceived of as unilateral and negotiations as
bilateral. A party who searches for a prospective contractual term-for
example, a party who window shops, or searches the Internet, or reads a
contract closely for terms-is thought to be acting unilaterally. Negotiation,
however, is seen as a bilateral process: The law mythologizes contract-making
as being about give and take and information exchange.' 9 The intuition that
courts ought not to attribute unilaterally incurred costs to the opposing
party is the root of some objections to including search costs in the contract
calculus.
Yet this unilateral-bilateral distinction rapidly disintegrates when closely
examined. Searches are for contract terms or items offered by other parties.
One party offers, another party searches for offers. Whether Party A searches
for a prospective counterparty that already offers what she wants, or
negotiates with that counterparty, it still takes two to contract.2° While
individuals often view negotiation costs as being caused by the recalcitrance
of the other side, the same is true of search costs. Imagine a party who hides
a clause within a contract. That behavior not only raises search costs for the
prospective counterparty, who now must search the contract to make sure
everything is as it appears, but it also raises the contracting costs for
everyone else who contracts in that particular area. This insight becomes
particularly important to the discussion of searches using computers,
where the expected success of a search is as much a function of the "search
optimization" of the offer as of the resources expended by the searcher.
2 2
18. Cf, Frank Adams, Jr., Why Brown v. Board of Education and Affirmative Action Can Save
Historically Black Colleges and Universities, 47 ALA. L. REV. 481, 487 n.30 (1996) ("'[T]oday's
decision places upon the State the ordinarily unsustainable burden of proving the negative
proposition that it is not responsible for extant racial disparity in enrollment.'" (quoting United
States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 753 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis omitted))); James A. Washburn, Note, Beyond Brown: Evaluating Equality in Higher
Education, 43 DUKE LJ. 1115, 1149 n.163 (1994) (quoting the same passage from Fordice as
quoted in Adams, supra).
19. See KN. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 YALE LJ. 779,
796-97 (1939).
20. See Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465, 467 (1857) ("All true contracts grow out of the
intentions of the parties to transactions, and are dictated only by their mutual and accordant
wills.").
21. See infra Part W.A.
22. David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate Two-Sided
Platforms, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 667, 689. Evans and Noel explain:
At a given size, expanding the number of customers on the platform can create
congestion that increases search and transaction costs. It may be possible to reduce
congestion by increasing the size of the physical platform, but that in turn may
1245
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Likewise, the bilateral reading of negotiation costs is misleading.
Negotiations are often one-sided.23 In fact, normal contracting behavior is so
one-sided that we have stretched concepts of consent beyond any reasonable
meaning of the term. 4 Further, we routinely compensate parties for
unilateral costs (reliance, for example), as long as they fall within the
negotiation framework.25 Thus, it is difficult to maintain the idea that a party
undertakes search costs unilaterally, while negotiation costs are the result of
both parties' common endeavor, and, thus, ought to be somehow favored.
Finally, while there is a significant difference between bilateral and
unilateral costs, that difference has nothing to do with negotiation or search
and everything to do with evidence. Unilateral costs are easier to invent,
26whereas evidence of bilateral costs is likely to be available to both sides. Yet
this evidentiary problem does not translate into a reason to disfavor
unilateral costs systematically, especially where a party incurred the costs in
27
reliance on the other party's representations. For example, in the
hypothetical that introduced this Article, the searcher relied upon the
representation by the seller that the home had two fireplaces. The searcher
incurred opportunity costs-the lost opportunity to buy elsewhere-because
of the inaccuracy in the material that she searched. This is not an unfamiliar
increase search costs .... [T]o optimize a customer's search for partners, [two-
sided platforms] may find that it is best to limit the size of the platform and
prescreen the customers on both sides to increase the probability of a match.
Id. (citation omitted).
23. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 139, 162
(2005) ("In any competitive system involving actors of varying levels of skill, with different
needs, desires and goals, every scarce resource-including bargaining power-will be subject to
unequal distributions."). See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95
HARV. L. REv. 741, 754-85 (1982) (showing how traditional contract-law assumptions about
bargaining are inappropriate when bargaining is too one-sided).
24. Barnhizer, supra note 23, at 152 ("As a practical matter, poor individuals often do lack
bargaining power-the power to obtain a preferred outcome in a transaction-in many
situations and are often systematically deprived of the ability to offer meaningful consent to
proffered contracts.").
25. See generally L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936); L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1936).
26. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115
YALE L.J. 814, 826 (2006) ("In the adversarial litigation system, the court chooses between the
self-interested evidence presented by the parties. The parties present only the evidence that is
in their respective self-interest, and the parties also bear most of the cost of their respective
evidence production.").
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) ("A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a
third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.").
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phenomenon elsewhere in the law. For example, unilateral reliance on a
21donative promise yields promissory estoppel.
Thus, instead of separating search costs from transaction costs based on
a false unilateral-bilateral distinction, it is better to understand the moral
hazard of relying on evidence that may only be in one party's hands. We
resolve this sort of problem procedurally. Discovery, for example, is our tool
to cause the parties to exchange information that only one side has so that
the other side may challenge and evaluate it.29 Additionally, triers of fact are
routinely asked to evaluate self-serving arguments asserted by one side based
on evidence only available to that side. A discount, not a disqualification, is
the appropriate response to the evidentiary challenges posed by unilateral
costs.
3. Objects of Search: Features, Contractual Terms, and Counterparties
Searches also differ with respect to the objectives of each search; often
we search for items with particular qualities. I would like a house with a view
of the river, and so that is what I search for.30 The search for items with
particular qualities is what we are most used to in terms of Internet searches.
When a searcher uses eBay, she enters the common name of the thing (e.g.,
a Ducati motorcycle or a Louis XIV chair), and then begins the more
laborious task of searching for the specific item she most desires by looking
at pictures, price terms, etc.3
1
This leads to the second objective of a search-contract terms.
Sometimes parties search for contracts that have specific terms. By far, the
most common search is for a contract that offers the lowest price term.32
Other searches are for warranties.33 Contract-term searches can be both
positive searches (searches for terms that parties want within the contract, to
make sure those terms are really there) and negative searches (searches to
34
make sure there is not some hidden clause that will cause grief later) .
Determining whether parties are searching for contract terms or
property features may seem confusing. Searchers do both: In terms of search
28. Id.
29. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1202, at 98 (3d ed. 2004) ("The provisions for discovery are so flexible and the provisions for
pretrial procedure and summary judgment so effective, that attempted surprise in federal
practice is aborted very easily, synthetic issues detected, and the gravamen of the dispute
brought frankly into the open for the inspection of the court.").
30. The unique characteristics of real property cause the legal regimes governing
contracts for land to be particularly concerned with search costs. See infra Part II.B.
31. See, e.g., eBay, http://www.eBay.com (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
32. See, e.g., Pricewatch, http://www.pricewatch.com (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
33. A search of "TV under warranty" in eBay.com returns results not only for television
sets still under warranty but also for free-floating contractual warranties available to extend the
purchaser's current television warranty.
34. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing positive and negative searches).
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costs, there is a continuum between the two-not a sharp break.15 Where the
range of product features is narrow (purchases of fungible items like nails,
for example) parties are likely to search contract terms (the variance in nails
will be in price or manufacturer reputation). Where the range of features is
wide and competition narrows the contractual range of prices and
warranties (for example, television sets), parties are likely to search product
features.
Finally, prospective contracting parties search for a trustworthy
counterparty.3 6 For example, eBay's reputation system provides a database of
transactions that allows potential contracting parties to learn whether prior
contracting parties deem a buyer or seller trustworthy.3 7 Within the
negotiation model of contract, the counterparty is accorded a strange status.
Although the counterparty is not a negotiated term, usually it is not
permissible to transfer one's duties under the contract to a third party
without the express consent of the counterparty. s The reputation of the
counterparty may affect a prospective party's decision immensely, and yet it
is not considered a negotiated contract term. Restrictions on the alienation
of contract rights and responsibilities only make sense in light of the search
costs involved in learning about a prospective counterparty.
B. THE ORIGINS OF SEARCH THEORYINPROPERTYLAW
Much of the literature on search costs has been in the field of property
law.3 9 The literature describes systems with high search costs and low
frustration costs as "contract" models. 40 On the other hand, the literature
terms systems with low search costs and (potentially) high frustration costs
41property" models of law.
35. Thanks to Leandra Lederman for the discussions out of which this idea grew.
36. See G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts:
Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 225 n.14 (1991) ("'[T]rust encourages
coordinative behavior by reducing the danger of [loss]' from high-risk bargaining behavior,
and 'even low-risk forms require some degree of trust[.]'" (quoting DEAN G. PRUITT,
NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 92, 100 (1981))); see alsoJohn M. Hawes, Kenneth E. Mast &John E.
Swan, Trust Earning Perceptions of Sellers and Buyers, 9J. PERS. SELLING & SALES MGMT. 1, 1 (1989)
("Trust is the binding force in most productive buyer/seller relationships.").
37. See eBay Feedback Forum, http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback.html (last
visited Mar. 15, 2007).
38. See generally Joshua G. Graubart, Unintended Consequences: State Merger Statutes and
Nonassignable Licenses, 2003 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 25 (discussing non-assignment clauses).
39. See generally, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 11O YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
40. See id. at 55 ("[C]ontract rights themselves can be tailored just as a house can be
custom-built, but the way of owning it is highly simplified to reduce information costs to third
parties.").
41. See id. at 38-42 (discussing the economically optimal standardization of property forms
as a function of frustration costs and information costs).
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Frustration cost is the cost of parties' inability to get precisely the deal
that they desired.42 One can think of frustration costs as the inefficiencies
occasioned by fitting the square peg of the optimal deal between the parties
into the round hole that the law provides for crafting that deal. For example,
if Party A desired to sell, and Party B to buy a parcel of land for use as a
factory site in an area zoned residential, the law will frustrate the deal and
the parties will not consummate a gainful trade. As in this example,
frustration costs are often imposed where externalities to other parties
(here, the residents living near the factory) would be higher than the costs
of frustration.43
If parties were able to enter into any deal they desired, they would
optimize the net satisfaction with the deal. However, there is a tradeoff. If
parties can make any deal they desire, there is a cost for third parties. For
example, if Party A sells Party B a microwave, and the sales contract disclaims
damages from bodily injury resulting from defective manufacture of the
microwave, then future purchasers now have higher search costs when
attempting to buy a microwave. They must now determine whether a
proposed sale includes the hidden cost of a damages disclaimer.
This sort of analysis has proven influential in property law, where courts
have deemed contractual restraints on property that do not "touch and
concern" the land unenforceable because they raise search costs for third
parties who may seek to buy land.44 However, these bright-line labels for
contract and property models are misleading. A property model is one that
recognizes the costs of idiosyncrasies to subsequent searching parties. 45 A
contract model is one that minimizes frustration costs by permitting parties
to individualize transactions." Of course, one can have contract models
governing property (for example, a legal regime that would permit an
idiosyncratic use restriction to run with the land). As this Article discusses, it
must also be possible to have a property model of contract law.
42. See id. at 35 (discussing the interaction between frustration costs and property rights).
43. See id. at 26-27 (discussing measurement-cost externalities).
44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 3.1-3.2 (2000) (eliminating the
formal requirement that servitudes touch and concern the land, but introducing a public-policy
requirement that tracks the same goals); see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 39, at 26 ("In
modem terminology, the Lord Chancellor thought that permitting interests [in covenants that
do not run with the land] to be established as property tights would create unacceptable
information costs to third parties.").
45. Merrill & Smith, supra note 39, at 26-27 ("The need for standardization in property
law stems from an externality involving measurement costs: Parties who create new property
rights will not take into account the full magnitude of the measurement costs they impose on
strangers to the title.").
46. See id. at 55 ("[C]ontract rights themselves can be tailored just as a house can be
custom-built, but the way of owning it is highly simplified to reduce information costs to third
parties.").
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This Article therefore makes the following distinction throughout: The
"property model" is distinguishable from "property law" in that the model
describes a system with low search costs and high frustration costs whereas
"property law" is that amalgam of doctrines and ideas that (among other
things) is taught in the first year of law school and that secures the flow of
high value land to high value users.47 Similarly, the "contract model" is
distinct from "contract law" in that the model reflects high search and low
frustration costs, whereas the area of contract law is that amalgam of
doctrines that generally permits parties to capitalize on pre-commitments
48and make gainful trades according to mutually acceptable terms. Either
model might apply to either area of law.49
In the broad area of property law, concepts of title searches and
limitations on idiosyncratic contractual-use restrictions are well-developed. 50
Thus, property theory has been the natural breeding ground for significant
legal academic literature on the relationship between search costs and
negotiation costs, resulting in the property model of law.5 If the number of
legal "boxes" into which a property transaction can be placed is limited, that
limitation makes property easy to search.5' This is the concept of the numenrs
clausus- Constrained legal forms may serve a function beyondjob security for
lawyers and frustration of the intentions of parties. 51 If, for example,
property law permitted parties to encumber property with idiosyncratic use
restrictions, then subsequent parties seeking to buy property of that type
would suffer higher search costs.54
The classic example of search costs in property is thus: Party A and Party
B enter into an agreement about Party A's bicycle such that Party B may use
the bicycle on Monday mornings. Because this agreement is a property
agreement, it is enforceable against anyone to whom Party A might sell the
bicycle.55 At this point, Parties A and B have made a mutually enriching
47. See id. at 38 ("There is a spectrum of possible approaches to property rights, ranging
from total freedom of customization on the one hand to complete regimentation on the
other.").
48. Cf. id. at 57 ("[C]ontract should be (and is) less standardized than is property law.").
49. See id. at 38.
50. See, e.g., Matthew Baker et al., Optimal Title Search, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 139-47
(2002).
51. See id. For a discussion of such costs with regard to contracting, see Klausner & Kahan,
Path Dependence, supra note 3, at 353-59; Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the
Integration of Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1139 (2002).
52. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 39, at 3-4.
53. See id. (defining numerus clausus as "the principle that property rights must track a
limited number of standard forms").
54. Id. at 26-27 ("[B]y allowing even one person to create an idiosyncratic property right,
the information processing costs of all persons who have existing or potential interests in this
type of property go up.").
55. Id. at 27 ("Why might the law restrict the freedom of A and B to create such an
unusual property right? ... Given the awareness that someone has created a Monday-only right,
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transaction. Party B has paid Party A for the use of the bicycle every Monday
morning. If Party A prefers the money to the use, and Party B prefers the use
to the money, they enrich society. Why, then, would we not enforce such a
Monday-morning property right?
One answer is that subsequent parties seeking to purchase bicycles bear
the cost of the idiosyncratic property right. Subsequent parties must
undertake searches to determine whether the property they wish to
purchase indeed is subject to such a use right. Imagine that Party C now
wishes to buy a bicycle. Party C is probably not trying to purchase the precise
bicycle that was the subject of the transaction between Parties A and B. Even
if we stipulate that this is a different bicycle entirely, and that Party C knows
that, it still does not solve Party C's problem. Party C must engage in a
systematic negative search; Party C must make sure that the use restriction
does not apply to any bicycle she wishes to purchase.
There is nothing about the above example, however, that relies on
property law in order to be true. Private ordering can raise public search
costs. Indeed, the property analysis relies on contract law (an idiosyncratic
use agreement) to create the private ordering that raises the costs of public
search. 56 Thus, these costs clearly apply in the law of contract as well as the
law of property. The next section, therefore, discusses the application of
search theory directly to contract law without the property analysis.
C. THE INSIGHTS OF SEARCH THEORYAPPLY TO MODERN CONTRACTING
Idiosyncratic language in a contractual agreement can raise search costs
for entire industries. For example, in the purchase of the microwave
described above, the idiosyncratic contractual disclaimer of damage causes
search costs to rise for subsequent prospective microwave purchasers.57 If the
new, strange disclaimer of damages is enforced, then parties who wish to be
protected in the event of a microwave explosion must now search their
contracts for a waiver of damages whenever they buy a microwave.
anyone else buying a watch must now also investigate whether any particular watch does not
include Monday rights.").
56. Id. at 42.
57. Indeed, the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") limits such disclaimers. U.C.C. §§ 2-
316(4), -318, -719(3) (2003). By not permitting disclaimers of bodily injury, the UCC removes
the need to search all contracts for such disclaimers. The more common-and incorrect-
explanation of the UCC's limitation on disclaimers of physical damage is as mere paternalism:
The law should protect consumers from certain contract terms. Yet this rings false, since parties
can shift price terms (microwaves will cost more) where they cannot shift risk.
As an aside, although revisions to Article 2 of the UCC were approved in 2003, this
Article will cite primarily to the pre-revision Article 2 because the new revisions have not been
adopted by any states. Revised Article 2, which was published in 2005, will be cited to the 2005
Edition of the UCC, while the pre-revision Article 2 will be cited to the 2003 Edition of the
UCC. Furthermore, revisions to Article 1 of the UCC were approved in 2001 and such revisions
have been adopted by the majority of the states. Thus, this Article will cite the revised Article 1
to the 2005 Edition of the UCC.
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Idiosyncratic contract language imposes negative search externalities on
non-parties to the contract, often either subsequent purchasers of a good or
other contracting parties working in the same industry.
The hook traditionally connecting the terms of property arrangements
to the larger community for purposes of search costs has been the fact that
property arrangements are enforced against third parties.58 Therefore,
property theory states that third parties must make costly searches for
idiosyncratic arrangements precisely because they are bound.5" An example
of the cost of two-party arrangements in the property context would be
racially restrictive covenants that run with real property6 0 If such covenants
were enforced, subsequent purchasers who wish to avoid such odious
arrangements must search the title for them.
Thus, one considerable challenge to a search theory of contract is how
the terms of a contract that binds only signatory parties can raise the costs of
a third party not bound by that particular contract. It is at this point that this
Article deviates from property theory. Property theorists have been unduly
concerned with the ability of property arrangements to bind third parties
instead of focusing more directly on whether idiosyncratic property
61arrangements raise search costs for third parties.
In a standard property arrangement, searchers are not particularly
concerned with the particular piece of property first encumbered by the
idiosyncratic use right. Instead, parties are concerned that whatever property
they might purchase would be encumbered by such a right. In the bicycle
example, above, the idiosyncratic use right in that particular bicycle is not
the source of concern to third parties. The chance that they will buy that62
particular bicycle (and be bound by that precise use right) is low. However,
after a court enforces an idiosyncratic use right in one bicycle, subsequent
58. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 39, at 54-55 (" [P] roperty rights are in rem-they serve
not only to bind successors in interest but the whole world."); see also Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 773, 778 (2001) [hereinafter
Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract]. Merrill and Smith noted:
The in personam/in rem distinction is not limited to what are conventionally
regarded as contract and property rights, but applies far more generally....
Nevertheless, the paradigmatic contract right adopts the in personam structure of
rights and duties, and the paradigmatic property right corresponds to the in rem
structure of rights and duties.
Id. at 778.
59. Merrill & Smith, supra note 39, at 27.
60. See generally Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer's Fiftieth Anniversary: "A Time for
Keeping; a Time for Throwing Away"?, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 61 (1998) (describing racially restrictive
covenants and discussing the implication of Shelley on private rights).
61. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Covenents and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906
(1998) (discussing how the rules of recordation help facilitate transactions that bind three or
more persons).
62. Merrill & Smith, supra note 39, at 27.
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bicycle purchasers have to worry about whether a similar right will be
attached to any other bicycle that they wish to purchase.63
This analysis certainly rings true in contract law. For example, suppose a
court gives effect to an idiosyncratic liquidated damages provision, or a
limitation of warranty, or a waiver of rights provision, in a contract. Other,
unrelated contracting parties will certainly not worry that the terms of that
contract will bind them because they were not signatories.64 However, parties
who contract after the court's decision will have to make sure that such a
provision does not appear in their own contracts with other parties." Their
search costs rise because they must be sure that undesirable but (now)
enforceable provisions are not part of their own agreements. 66
Another example, this time from the services industry: Suppose you
enter a restaurant and intend to ask the waiter to bring you a soft drink. The
common, standard treatment in the United States is that subsequent soft
drinks are free. But there are idiosyncratic exceptions: Some restaurants
charge customers on a per-drink basis or might charge a low cost for a refill.
Even though one restaurant's arrangement does not bind any other
restaurant and one customer's decision also does not bind any third parties,
the existence of the idiosyncratic per-drink arrangement raises search costs.
Thus, you must either ask the waiter whether the restaurant will charge you
for refills, or (as is commonly the case) you must proceed blindly and will be
surprised-and not a little inconvenienced-to find out after the fact that
the restaurant charges for refills.
Courts also play a role in lowering contracting costs by enforcing
standardized contract language. Similarly, the language that courts enforce
becomes the standard in contracts. The effect is the same-the parties reap
the benefit of lower contract costs. It is unsurprising that when parties use,
and courts enforce, idiosyncratic contract provisions, courts raise search
costs for subsequent contracting parties. As noted above, court-tested
boilerplate language lowers drafting costs precisely because the language has
63. Id. ("[B]y allowing even one person to create an idiosyncratic property right, the
information processing costs of all persons who have existing or potential interests in this type
of property go up.").
64. Other commentators have noted this phenomenon, although from the perspective of
weighing costs of permissive rules in negotiations, rather than from the perspective of searching
for new contracts:
[I]f X and Y can alter a permissive rule, a court might be called upon to decide
whether they have in fact done so. The court's determination might increase
contracting costs in a similar type of contract subsequently entered into by A and
B, since they will want to eliminate any uncertainty about whether they have
retained the permissive rule to govern their contract.
CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAw: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 138-39
(2d ed. 2002).
65. Id. at 138-39.
66. Id. at 139.
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been tested by courts.67 Even if the language goes unnoticed by the court,
that lack of remarkability is an indication that the language is successful.
Boring is safe when it comes to contract language. If a given court finds the
language unremarkable, it is increasingly likely that subsequent courts will
68do the same. Similarly, a novel interpretation of banal contractual
language is decreasingly likely as courts review more of the same
documents. 69 This may be a function of simple institutional fatigue (judges
and clerks can only focus on so many issues), and oft-repeated contractual
phrases may have the edges worn off by mere repetition to judges.
Litigants often advance another argument against novel interpretations
of standardized contractual language, which is inexplicable under contract
theory up until now. Parties often advise courts that if they adopt a novel
interpretation of standardized language, then it will disrupt many other
routine commercial transactions. For example, courts recognize that
industries, not just individual contracting parties, have an interest in
consistent term construction.70 This argument highlights the hidden
presence of the role of search within contract law. If courts truly subscribed
to the negotiation model of contract, they would refuse to consider the
effects of the courts' constructions of private arrangements on the broader
industry. Each contract would be construed as an island.
This is not the case. Courts consider the impact of their interpretations
of contract language on the broader community of meaning. For example,
courts consider custom and trade usage under both the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") and the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods ("CISG"). Both the UCC and the CISG apply an
objective-not subjective-standard of custom and trade usage. 7' Thus, a
67. See Klausner & Kahan, Standardization, supra note 3, at 718; see also Robert A. Hillman &
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 439
(2002) (arguing that uniform terms are efficient and reduce bargaining costs).
68. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 67, at 439.
69. See id.
70. See Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA, 169 F.3d 747, 753 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding that,
where a space-station construction contract called for "relamping" of project prior to
completion, a contractor only was required to replace nonworking lamps because replacement
of all lamps was inconsistent with the trade meaning of "relamping"); Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Scor Reinsurance Co., 62 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that extrinsic evidence, in the
form of industry custom and practice, was admissible to interpret ambiguous notice-of-
occurrence clauses in reinsurance policies issued by a reinsurer to a primary insurer).
71. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 9(2), Apr. 11, 1980,
S. TREATY DOc. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 61, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf [hereinafter CISG]; U.C.C. § 1-303(b), (c) (2005). Article
9(2) of the CISG provides:
The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or
ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and
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novice who enters a new industry is bound not by his understanding of the
terms, but by the objective meaning of the terms in the broad industry.72 If
courts truly were interested in the subjective meaning of terms as between
parties, they would construe contract terms in accordance with the actual
demonstrated meanings of terms as used by the specific parties to a contract.
They do not do this, however, and instead construe the terms of the parties'
contract as consistent with meanings understood by the industry as a whole,
thus validating the community's interest in keeping search costs low.
73
In sum, property arrangements are not alone in affecting a larger
search community.74 Idiosyncratic contract language, if enforced, also raises
search costs and affects parties who are not signatories to the contract in
which the idiosyncratic language is used. In Wittgensteinian terms, the
applicable community of meaning includes not only the particular parties to
a contract, but includes the universe of contracting parties who rely on the
standardization function of courts as to a given industry.7 As before, if the
meeting of the minds between two parties as to idiosyncratic contract terms
(or idiosyncratic interpretations of a previously settled and standardized
term) is given effect, the broader contracting community suffers higher
search costs.
The insights of search theory seem to apply to contracting behavior; the
next section, therefore, examines the gap in the literature that has caused
this phenomenon to go unrecognized.
D. THE EXISTING LITERATURE HAS NOT CLOSEL YEXAMINED
A SEARCH-CENTEREo THEORY OF CONTRACT
The existing literature has focused heavily on the benefits of contract
standardization to contract drafters (usually the sellers of products) in terms
of saved drafting or litigation costs76 or increased ability to use hidden
contract language to extract money from consumers through obfuscation or
cartels.77 But standardization does not solely benefit contract drafters:
regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular
trade concerned.
CISG, supra, art. 9(2).
72. CISG, supra note 71, art. 9(2); U.C.C. § 1-303(b), (c).
73. See GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 64, at 110-12.
74. Cf Merrill & Smith, supra note 39, at 54-56.
75. See generally KRIPKE, supra note 12 (analyzing the primary concepts behind
Wittgenstein's ideas on philosophy of language and mathematics).
76. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REv. 211 (1995); Klausner & Kahan, Standardization, supra note 3; Russell Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203
(2003).
77. See generally David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form
Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive
Effects, 104 MICH. L. REv. 983 (2006).
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Prospective purchasers (or contract "readers") benefit from information
standardization too.
For example, travelers on the interstate highway system may well choose
to go to a franchise restaurant not only because the restaurants routinely
benefit from economies of scale that allow them to pass along lower costs to
the consumer but also because the travelers know what to expect. The
franchise system creates information economies for potential diners, notjust
production benefits for the franchisee. The same economies exist in
contract: Parties often prefer the standard deal to an idiosyncratic one.
Some literature discusses how consumers deal with complex contracts
by freeriding on a minority of consumers who presumably read them.78 Even
this literature only explains how consumers cope with the supposed
immense information burdens of standardized contracts. The literature does
not discuss whether standardization actually lowers information costs in
contracts. Thus, a theory of contractual search inevitably extends beyond the
current discussions of contract standardization in the literature. The
following sections examine the questions raised by prior literature in more
depth and discuss how it differs from a search theory, focusing on the
benefits of information standardization to the searching party.
1. The Boilerplate Literature Focuses on Drafting and
Negotiation Costs Instead of Search
The literature on search costs in contracting has, to date, focused on
the value of standardized contractual language in lowering negotiation costs
between expert negotiators. 79 For example, one approach analyzed why
parties often used abstruse boilerplate language.80 This analysis had three
parts: (1) it determined that parties used boilerplate as a way of reusing
contracting language and saving drafting costs;8 ' (2) it noted that boilerplate
might be a signal to the other party that neither party was seeking a secret
advantage couched in novel contract terms;82 and (3) it discussed the value
of boilerplate as language that courts had vetted to some degree.88 But this
analysis is still essentially a two-party model focused on negotiation costs.
Parties may well use boilerplate as a way of signaling benign intentions
toward their counterparties. If this approach is correct, boilerplate lowers
the negotiation costs of contracting.
This Article addresses search costs in contracting from a different angle.
The boilerplate approach does not examine the importance of contract-
78. See generally Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26J. LEGAL
STUD. 377 (1997).
79. Klausner & Kahan, Standardization, supra note 3, at 723-24.
80. Id. at 719-20.
81. Id. at 720-21.
82. Id. at 723.
83. Id. at 722.
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language standardization in the initial search-what the traditional law of
contract considers to be part of the pre-contractual moment. While the
boilerplate approach offers reasons why standardized language is valuable to
the offeror, it does not supply a theory by which to understand why
consumers rationally might prefer to accept standardized terms.
2. The Economic Analysis of Electronic Contracting Raises
Still-Open Questions of Search
Another line of literature examines whether electronic contracting is
somehow different.8 4 This literature asks, for example, whether the Internet
might lower search costs by permitting search engines to parse contracts
quickly.8 ' "Burying" provisions would be less effective if search engines could
sniff out the buried terms.8 6 Search costs of long contracts would be lowered,
under this vision, purely by the power of computers to "read" a contract
87quickly.
This Article recognizes a serious intellectual debt to the electronic-
contracting literature. However, the electronic-contracting analysis considers
technological search as one feature in the electronic-contracting landscape
and does not bear down on broader issues of search costs in contracting.
8 8
This Article seeks to focus on issues of search across contracting contexts,
including electronic contracting, the common law of contract, and the UCC.
Second, the prior literature on electronic contracting leaves questions
for future work. For example, consider the idea that search costs will fall
because computers will help parties to read contracts more quickly.89 A
computer program certainly could compare a contract to prior versions of
the same (or a contract to a standardized and commonly accepted version of
the same). But a search engine can only recognize what it has seen already
and would not identify novel contract terms. This program would not be
84. For an excellent treatment of this subject, see generally Katz, supra note 8 (analyzing
the effect of online contracting on common law doctrines from the economic perspective).
85. Id. at 17 ("It is easier and cheaper to look into the details of contractual language
when one has access to electronic text and can use software search algorithms to discover
critical or difficult terms.").
86. Id. at 16-20.
87. As Katz explains:
An offeree in possession of a good search engine, for instance, should be able to
check a contract or multiple contracts for unfavorable terms much more easily
than in the traditional setting, so long as the terms follow a standard format. Such
formats such as XML (extended markup language, an extension of the HTML
language) will provide such a standard so long as they are widely adopted.
Id. at 30.
88. For example, one major element of online contracting discussed by the literature has
been pseudonymity, whereby parties incorrectly believe they can engage in fraud due to
physical distance and difficulties in tracing real identities online.
89. See Katz, supra note 8,. at 16, 29.
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able to prioritize the importance of departures. For example, it would treat a
misplaced comma with the same importance as a disclaimed waiver
provision, thus requiring a human to make a judgment call anyway, and
ultimately not lowering search costs.
It is also not immediately clear that computers will lower the costs of
reading contracts because a computer will accept false positives. Anyone who
has misspelled "from" as "form" and had a spellchecker fail to catch the
distinction will know what I mean-the presence of spellcheckers has
significantly lowered humans' capacity to spell but has not significantly
reduced the need for proofreading.
Finally, although a computer could scan a contract, it would be quite
difficult for it to report to the human. While a computer could point out
differences between one contract and another, the computer could not
condense the contract. It is not able to rephrase the content in a shortened
and clear manner that would allow a human to comprehend the entire
contract.
In building on the current literature, this Article seeks to develop a new
response to the problem of computer-read contracts. The major impact of
technology on contract terminology and reading is not the speed at which
computers can read contracts alone, but rather is found in the steps that
humans take to "search optimize" their contracts. This inquiry into search
optimization helps us to understand that modern searches are essentially
bilateral activities: The searcher indeed spends resources searching, but the
party searched for also spends resources on being searchable.
3. The Online-Standardization Literature Does Not Cover Search
The debate over standardization and Internet contracting is marked by
especially strong opinions. Some commentators argue that courts apply the
regime of unconscionability and the practice of invalidating contracts of
adhesion in precisely the same fashion online and offline.0 Commentators
assert that the common law has long had a theory of "blanket consent" that
governed "money now, terms later" contracts, and that online contracting
does not appreciably alter this theory.9'
This approach has a certain practical appeal; it is, however, incomplete.
Courts do use language developed in the course of offline dealings to
validate online contracts. To do otherwise would cause courts to appear to
abandon precedent. But court decisions governing online end-user license
agreements have reached far beyond a theory of blanket consent in the
online environment. For example, in one recent case, a court found that
90. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 67, at 439.
91. Id. at 438-39.
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mere accessing of a computer program was consent sufficient to require the
consumer to give up critical fair-use rights.
92
Another common approach to standardized contract language is the
argument that standardization vitiates negotiated consent.93 For example,
recent statutes have lowered the contractual standard of negotiated consent
to passive assent when the party engages in online contracting. 4
Commentators have questioned whether consent has a continued place in
electronic contracting, given the assent norm and standardized texts that are
95presented as take-it-or-leave-it bargains. This is essentially an online
intensification of the idea that standardization vitiates consent.
A theory of search allows departure from the model of standardization
as a threat to consent. Instead, a search-oriented view of contract permits us
to preserve the useful concept of consent while enforcing standardized
contracts. Under a theory of search, the meaningful option to search for
another contractual counterparty preserves consent. Many deals are both
standardized and take-it-or-leave-it, but the two attributes are legally and
intellectually distinct. Within a framework of search, one can see that
standardization in bargains could in fact aid choice and competition by
speeding up searches for alternatives.9 6 In a competitive market, the
searcher can take someone else's deal.
Thus, none of the prior approaches have presented a search-focused
analysis. They have remarked on the usefulness of boilerplate in reducing
drafting or negotiation costs, have discussed whether electronic contracts
are different, or have worried that online standardized contracts vitiate
consent. There is no systematic analysis of the role that search costs and
searches play across contracting behavior. The next section will begin that
analysis by examining the roles (both positive and negative) that search
already plays in the common law of contract.
92. Davidson & Assocs. v.Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 640-41 (8th Cir. 2005).
93. See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J.
1125, 1149-53 (2000) (arguing that convenience must not drive out consent in contracts in the
new digital era).
94. Id. at 1142-43.
95. Id. at 1155-60.
96. For example, the court in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg explained:
Terms of use are no less a part of "the product" than are the size of the database
and the speed with which the software compiles listings. Competition among
vendors, not judicial revision of a package's contents, is how consumers are
protected in a market economy. ProCD has rivals, which may elect to compete by
offering superior software, monthly updates, improved terms of use, lower price,
or a better compromise among these elements.
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
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III. A SEARCH-CENTERED THEORY OF CONTRACT
Thus far, this Article has sought to establish that search theory indeed
applies to contracts and that the literature to date has not examined this
phenomenon. This section, therefore, discusses how the common law
currently deals with issues of search. Part A will discuss several prominent
common law doctrines that form the core of the negotiation theory of
contract. These doctrines inefficiently subsidize the negotiation model, or
under-recognize the search model, causing parties to invest inefficiently in
negotiation. Part B will discuss other common law rules that have permitted
courts, sub silencio, to recognize some search interests in contract.
A. TRADITONAL CONTRACTDOCTRINE CONTINUES TO
Focus ON NEGOTIATION COSTS
This section assesses several core doctrines of the negotiation-centric
view of contract law; that is, the notions of the "meeting of the minds," of
negotiated consent, and of the benefit of the bargain. Some contracts and
areas of law are more negotiation-oriented and others are more search-
oriented. Parties tend to negotiate capital purchases such as equipment or
real estate development: no amount of search can create the precise deal
that the buyer desires, so some degree of customization must occur.
Conversely, searches are far more useful for transactions in standardized
goods that vary in limited and searchable aspects. The following sections do
not, therefore, argue that the core negotiation doctrines are never useful.
Rather, when courts apply negotiation-centered doctrines to searched
contracts, they produce inefficient investment in negotiation or inefficient
avoidance of searches.
1. The "Meeting of the Minds"
A "meeting of the minds" is legal slang for the state that exists between
two parties intending to create a legally binding commitment subject to
relatively unambiguous terms. When a meeting of the minds occurs, courts
enforce the terms against the parties despite later changes in fact. 9' When
parties have carefully negotiated the terms of a contract, courts enforce
those terms with special force.99
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22 (1981) (discussing the doctrine of
mutual assent). See generally Ammons v. Cordova Floors, Inc., 904 So. 2d 185 (Miss. Ct. App.
2005); Klamen v. Genuine Parts Co., 848 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
98. Cf Wiljamaa v. Bd. of Educ. of Flint, 213 N.W.2d 830, 831 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)
(requiring a board of education to reinstate a teacher after it changed the effective date of her
resignation without her knowledge because there was no meeting of the minds).
99. Cf Del Serrone Contracting Corp. v. Avon Twp., 257 N.W.2d 667, 668 (Mich. Ct. App.
1977) (holding that a rubber-stamped endorsement did not establish the requisite meeting of
the minds).
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But when courts apply the doctrine to contracts that fall on the search
end of the spectrum, it produces inefficient investments by inserting the
trappings of negotiation into non-negotiated contracts. For example,
consider the practice of initialing a contractual term or placing it in bold or
capital letters to indicate that a perusing consumer must have noted the
term and, therefore, the term is part of the meeting of the minds. If a party
initials a provision in a contract showing that the parties gave it special
negotiated force, the court is more likely to deem that provision effective.'00
This is true even where there might be some other legal doctrine
(unconscionability or a standardized term that might seem to conflict with
the negotiated term) that would normally cause a court to discount the
provision. Other routine methods of drawing attention to a provision (to
make it seem negotiated) are: using all capitals, providing directional
statements such as "Important: Read Paragraph 3," using bolded lettering,
or any other attention-getting device.'0 '
This model works as long as serious, individuated negotiation was
indeed part of the process. But in the context of consumer purchases,
parties use these negotiation-highlighting devices more for judges than for
consumers. There is no serious expectation that drawing the consumer's
attention to the contract term will lead to a discussion about whether the
consumer wants that specific term. Thus, the investments in negotiation-
marking language are inefficient, and, to a degree, openly deceptive. These
instruments merely encourage courts to continue applying a negotiation
paradigm to a non-negotiated contract system. This leads to a discussion of
consent to non-negotiated contracts, continued in the next section.
2. Negotiated Consent
Currently, the legal concept of consent means negotiated consent.' °2
Courts have conflated consent with negotiation, but a concept of consent
born out of a model of negotiation cannot survive modern contracting-
especially Internet contracting. As search costs fall, a greater number of
contracting parties turn to searchable networks to make purchases. So, by
relying more on search, buyers rely less on negotiation. This causes a
problem for the traditional conception of negotiated consent.
100. See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 794-95 (2002) ("[K]nowledgeable drafters can probably engineer
consent .... How many times, dear reader, have you-prompted by a selling agent-signed or
initialed a space or a box on a standard form, just below language which recites 'I have read
and understood the above provisions' ....").
101. This discussion is usually found in state-court treatments of procedural
unconscionability. See, e.g., Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88,
96-103 (N.J. 2006).
102. See Isler v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp., 749 F.2d 22, 23 (10th Cir. 1984) ("The very notion of
contract is the consensual formation of relationships with bargained-for duties.").
1261
92 IOWA LA WREVIEW
As a result, the concept of contractual consent has come under serious
pressure, especially in regard to online transactions. For example, when a
person searches for a television set online and clicks on a button marked
"buy now," to what serious degree has that person perused and digested the
legal documents hidden somewhere else on the website that comprise the
written contract between the parties, much less negotiated the result? Not at
all.
This old framework, where consent is only valid within the context of
negotiation, has led us to systematically devalue consent. 10 3 Society must
allow Internet transactions; it would be too inefficient not to do so.
Reasoning backward, then, courts must find negotiated consent within these
• 104
transactions. If courts can only find consent as a function of negotiation,
then courts must find that online, "buy now" contracts somehow are
negotiated by the parties.
10 5
As things stand, therefore, courts and statutes have stretched the legal
fiction of negotiated consent beyond the breaking point of reason or
experience. For example, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act redefines "consent" with the term "assent," thereby bringing a range of
passive behaviors into the realm of negotiated consent.1 6 The key to solving
the problem of the growing and invidious legal fiction of negotiated consent
is to divorce negotiation from consent. A search theory of contract separates
the two quite neatly. Searches are as valid an expression of consent as
negotiations. If, following a search, a party accepts a deal, that deal
demonstrates as much consent as the traditional negotiated one. The fiction
of choice as applied to negotiation is not a fiction when applied to search.0 7
The entire idea of enforcing non-negotiated contracts under some legal
fiction of informed consent is that we assume parties are free to search for
other counterparties that offer better terms if the parties do not like the
counterparties' terms. Thus, theories of search undergird our entire
103. Consider, for example, the devaluation of consent implicit in the progressive judicial
enforcement of adhesion contracts, form contracts, shrink-wrap licenses, click-wrap licenses,
and potentially browse-wrap licenses. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393,
428-30 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing shrink-wrap, click-wrap, and browse-wrap licenses); Specht v.
Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 592-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same); Pollstar v.
Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000) ("[A] browse wrap license is part of
the web site and the user assents to the contract when the user visits the web site. No reported
cases have ruled on the enforceability of a browse wrap license.").
104. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996); Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d
at 593-95.
105. Courts have found these contracts negotiated. See Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 593-94
("The few courts that have had occasion to consider click-wrap contracts have held them to be
valid and enforceable.").
106. SeeUNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONsAcT § 105(d)(4), 7 U.L.A. 242 (2002).
107. See generally Barnhizer, supra note 23; Daniel D. Barnhizer, Propertization Metaphors for
Bargaining Power and Control of the Self in the Information Age, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 69, 95-101
(2006).
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fictionalized account of negotiated contract. It is time for courts to begin
using the language of search costs explicitly, rather than continuing toS • 108
discuss fictional negotiations.
How does a party withhold consent within a search paradigm? The
searcher refuses to do business with Counterparty A and looks for a new
counterparty. Thus, where the negotiation model of contract searches for
consent within a transaction, where it can only be found by torturing the
definition of consent, a search model of contract finds consent quite easily
by examining the range of possible transactions searched and determining
which was selected by the searching party.
3. The "Benefit of the Bargain"
The negotiation model of contract affects not only courts' interpretive
rules but also the remedies they apply. A traditional remedial goal of black
letter contract law is to give parties the benefit of their bargain. Therefore,
remedies are based on the perceived benefit that each party sought from the
bargain.'0 9 If courts are good at crafting remedies for negotiation costs but
bad at crafting remedies for search costs, parties will invest inefficiently in
negotiation and avoid search.
Focusing on the bargained-for elements of a contract under-recognizes
the role of nonbargained elements. When nonbargained elements were not
bargained for because they were the objects of a search, the difficulty grows.
For example, suppose a party searches in the "memorabilia" search category
on eBay to find a signed baseball."0 The party enters into a standard
contract with the seller, which includes a clause that the baseball is sold "as
is." Later, the purchaser finds that the signature is not genuine but is just for
show. The question is whether a court should consider the "memorabilia"
search-category placement as part of the bargain. Should a court offer any
remedy for the fact that the seller placed the baseball in the "memorabilia"
category, even though the seller offered no assurance of authenticity during
their negotiations? If courts lack the tools to do so, parties will stop trusting
in cheap searches and will turn to more expensive negotiations. In this case,
eBay users would cease trusting the results of their eBay category searches
and would invest inefficiently in negotiations by requiring redundant written
assurances that what the buyer searched for as memorabilia is in fact
108. Of course, actual negotiations often have taken place in contracting. When the court
deals with that portion of the negotiation-search continuum, an account of negotiation is
perfectly appropriate. Problems arise when courts fictionalize negotiation by applying it to the
search end of the continuum.
109. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-716 (2003) (providing remedy of specific performance where
damages calculated according to the benefit of the bargain model would be unjust).
110. See Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 707 (Ca. Ct. App. 2002) (posing this
hypothetical).
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memorabilia. The redundant negotiation is inefficient, but necessary insofar
as courts fail to recognize searches in remedial schemes.
Overall, the negotiation-centered doctrines at the core of common law
contract poorly serve both courts attempting to parse contracts that fall at
the search end of the spectrum and parties who have searched for contracts
rather than negotiated for them. However, other doctrines in the common
law do validate searches, although often the issue is not expressly discussed.
The next section, therefore, begins a discussion of how the common law, at
times, implicitly has validated the search interest in contract, even while
lacking the tools to do so explicitly.
B. SEARCH PLAYS A CENTRAL, BUT UNDER-RECOGNIZED, ROLE IN THE
COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT
The core negotiation doctrines neither validate the growing use of
searches to replace negotiations nor the attempts to reduce search costs.
Other common law rules, however, have long paid covert attention to search
costs. This section will explore some of the ways that the common law has
recognized search interests or some rules that, whatever their original
inspiration, do in fact limit or validate search costs.
1. Common Law Interpretive Rules Validating Search
While many common law doctrines nominally intend to give effect to
the individualized will of the parties, they in fact limit the ability of the
parties to seek enforcement of idiosyncratic understandings of standardized
and settled contractual terms. Several common law doctrines notably limit
the cost of individuated contracting to the broader contracting community.
a. Construction of Terms According to Their Plain Meanings Lowers Search Costs
The first fundamental act of contract interpretation is the construction
of the meaning of the terms themselves."' The "plain meaning" canon
contributes directly to lowering search costs. A court committed to enforcing
the simple meaning of the contractual language might pride itself on
enforcing the will of the two parties who drafted the contract. Yet even the
simple act of trying to construe what two parties meant when they drafted a
contract is complicated by the fact that when two parties use words they are
participating in a broader, community conversation as to what those words
112
mean.
Parties negotiate meaning within the context of a community.
Therefore, what courts actually do when attempting to ascertain the
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981).
112. See generally Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d
641, 644 (Cal. 1968) (containing Judge Traynor's famous rationalization of the parol evidence
rule based on the contextual nature of language).
1264 [2007]
THE SEARCH INTEREST IN CONTRA CT
meaning of a term is to decide what the term would mean to a member of
the relevant community of meaning."3 If a judge wants to know what a
"grinder" is, she is well advised to ask whether the contracting parties make
submarine sandwiches or run meatpacking plants. Thus, even when a court
is attempting to make sense of the words of a contract, the court must draw
from the broader community of meaning.
This is especially relevant to the search costs of members of that
community. The court does not merely draw from the pool of a given
community of meaning-it contributes to that pool as well. If the court
construes a term in a way that voids an industry standard, for example, that
construction imposes significant costs on the industry. Thus, when courts
seek to determine the plain meaning of a term, they are not seeking to
determine how the parties intended to use it but rather what the term
means to the broader community of meaning-the industry. 14 This
approach lowers search costs for all other parties in that industry because
they do not have to worry about idiosyncratic interpretations of industry-
wide terms.
15
b. The Parol Evidence Rule Lowers Search Costs by Limiting Evidence in Support of
Extrinsic and Idiosyncratic Meanings of Terms
Similarly, the parol evidence rule masquerades as a rule about good
evidence; it is, however, also a rule that reduces search costs."" Let us
imagine that a court has before it accurate and verifiable extrinsic
information about what the parties meant by a term of the contract. It is odd
113. See Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("A contract
has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A
contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually
words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent."); see also C. H. Pope & Co. v.
Bibb Mfg. Co., 290 F. 586, 587 (2d Cir. 1923) (quoting Hotchkiss); SAMUEL WILLISTON,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 612-613 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 1961).
114. See, e.g., Ragus Co. v. City of Chicago, 628 N.E.2d 999, 1001-02 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
(upholding utilization of trade usage to construe the meaning of a contract inconsistently with
its clear language, but consistently with industry standards).
115. See Klausner, supra note 3, at 776 ("Ajudicial opinion that interprets one corporation's
contract term in effect embeds that interpretation in the contracts of all firms that use the same
term.").
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981). The Restatement provides:
(1) A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that
it is inconsistent with them. (2) A binding completely integrated agreement
discharges prior agreements to the extent that they are within its scope. (3) An
integrated agreement that is not binding or that is voidable and avoided does not
discharge a prior agreement. But an integrated agreement, even though not
binding, may be effective to render inoperative a term which would have been part
of the agreement if it had not been integrated.
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to imagine that such a court would wish to exclude accurate evidence of the
intention of the parties just because it is extrinsic to the contract.
Yet courts do exclude such evidence. An example may help. In two
cases, the argument is made that the term "commercial grinder" means a
meat grinder that has the capacity to grind meat up to a very fine texture. In
both cases, the purchaser of the grinder was unsatisfied with the grinder
because it only ground to a fine texture. In Case A, however, the purchaser
presents the court with an e-mail stating: "It is critical that the grinder you
send to us be able to grind to a 'very fine' texture," to which the reply is:
"Understood." However, the court excludes the e-mails because the contract
is fully integrated.
In Case B, the parties present the court with the same facts; however, in
this case, the purchaser seeks to introduce evidence that industry custom is
that all commercial grinders can grind to a very fine texture. The court
would consider this argument as industry custom and practice that does not
directly contradict the terms of the contract. Thus, while accurate extrinsic
evidence of the individualized intentions of the parties is commonly
excluded from the court's interpretive calculus, evidence of industry custom
and practice commonly is included, either under the "plain meaning" or
"custom and practice" canons of construction.
Only a search theory of contract can make sense of this pattern. The
parol evidence rule is likely to exclude extrinsic evidence that imposes high
search costs on third parties (that is, idiosyncratic understandings not set
forth in the contract) in the same industry.117 And courts are likely to permit
extrinsic evidence that lowers search costs (custom and practice, industry
standards) under the pretense that courts are merely examining such
evidence to determine what the parties meant."'
117. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 467 n.6 (1985) ("Although the
franchisees contended that Burger King officials had given them oral assurances concerning
assignment, the District Court found that pursuant to the parol evidence rule any such
assurances 'even if they had been made and were misleading were joined and merged' into the
final agreement." (citation omitted)); see also St. Johns N. F. Shipping Corp. v. S. A. Companhia
Geral Commercial do Rio de Janeiro, 263 U.S. 119, 120 (1923) (summarizing petitioner's
argument and discussing, in a positive way, earlier cases where "testimony was offered to modify
the custom by an oral contract, and [two state supreme courts] refused to admit such evidence
on the ground of the parol evidence rule").
118. See Porto Rico Sugar Co. v. Lorenzo, 222 U.S. 481, 482 (1912) (finding that parol
evidence of the local grinding season based on industry practice properly was admitted to
determine the time of performance, which was not specified in a contract to grind sugarcane).
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c. The Four-Corners and Contract-Integration Doctrines
Also Lower Search Costs
Similarly, the four-corners and contract-integration doctrines also serve
the function of lowering information costs." 9 The rationale offered for these
rules traditionally has been "information forcing." That is, if the parties did
not bargain to include the term within the four corners of the document or
did not include the term in an integrated agreement (depending on how
the doctrine plays out), then the parties do not get the benefit of the term.
These doctrines presumably force parties to include terms they want.
Yet additional idiosyncratic terms are costly to search. How, then, can a
rule that encourages parties to clog up contracts with such terms be search-
friendly? Perhaps one answer lies in turning the question around and
examining what terms the doctrines exclude. These doctrines exclude
idiosyncratic terms that are related to the subject matter-that is,
individualized arrangements that deviate from baseline assumptions about
how parties usually conduct business of a given sort. 29 For example, if a
party sells his house but later desires to introduce evidence in litigation that
he did not intend to sell a house fixture (say, a porch swing) with the house,
a court will bar him from so doing if he did not include the provision in the
contract. The baseline assumption is that fixtures are sold with the house,
and if the seller wants to complicate the parties' contracting by stating
otherwise, he had better do so explicitly."'
The important part of the analysis is the determination by the court of
what sorts of provisions parties expect to be in what sorts of transactions.
Violating the expectations for a transaction of that type leads to exclusion of
the term. These expectations are understood most cogently as commonly
held conceptions about what bundle of negotiations a given transaction will
include. Note that these expectations technically are no more part of the
119. See, e.g., Barron Bancshares, Inc. v. United States, 366 F.3d 1360, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(holding that an integration clause conclusively establishes that the integration is total and
prohibits the use of external evidence to add to or modify the terms of a written agreement).
120. UAW-GM Human Res. Ctr. v. KSL Recreation Corp., 579 N.W.2d 411,421 n.14 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1998). When concluding that parol evidence was not admissible to contradict the
integration clause, the court noted:
To consider parol evidence in interpreting a written contract that includes an
integration clause is to accord the integration clause no meaning. An integration
clause is not merely an additional "factor" to be weighed in light of the affidavits
and other extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' understandings .... [It] is
an internal rule of construction that any previous or contemporaneous agreements
are nullified.
Id.
121. See, e.g., Westdale Co. v. Gietzen, 185 N.W.2d 596, 598 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) ("A
written agreement which is complete on its face, unambiguous in its terms, intended by the
parties to be a complete integration of their agreement, and signed by the parties to be bound
cannot be varied or changed without consent or subsequent agreement.").
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written contract than the idiosyncratic term that the four-corners rule
rejected. Yet courts do not discard both commonly held assumptions and
the idiosyncratic terms. Rather, courts discard the idiosyncratic terms as
conflicting with the commonly held assumptions about what terms ought to
be part of a contract. The four-corners rule is, therefore, an exclusion of
idiosyncratic contract terms absent a clear statement and, therefore, a
search-cost-lowering function.
2. Search-Oriented Remedies in Contract Doctrine
Similarly, some contract remedies are already influenced by search
costs, even though that influence has gone undernoticed. This section will
discuss two ideas. The first is that the basic common law presumption in
favor of remedies at law presumes low search costs. The second is an
explanation of the struggle between reliance and expectation damages for
contracts from a search-oriented perspective.
a. Limiting Contract Remedies to Money Damages Presumes Low Search Costs
One of the truisms of common law contract is that when a remedy is
available at law, equitable relief is presumptively not available. The
exception proves the rule: If I contract with Pablo Picasso to draw my
portrait, then it is possible that I may receive specific performance because it
would be too costly for me to find an alternative artist combining Picasso's
style and reputation.
Alternatively, where the performance of a contract is related to fungible
goods, a party is usually limited to an action at law.112 Fungibility is a proxy
for low search costs. If the goods are fungible, it is not difficult to find
another party willing to supply the same goods at a price close to the price
that the parties originally negotiated. Plus, courts can address shortfalls
caused by having to purchase fungible goods on the spot market by
adjusting damages. Thus, concepts of search seem to drive the selection of
remedies at least as much as the concept of fairness or equity drives the
selection.
b. Compensating Parties for Reliance Indicates a Sensitivity to Search Costs
Reliance can be measured as a function of rising search costs. Imagine a
television manufacturer that wants a stable contractual relationship with a
parts supplier for its televisions. In the initial search phase, any supplier will
do, as long as its parts perform the required function. So, the manufacturer
cheaply locates a supplier and enters into a contract with that supplier to
provide the parts.
122. Id. See generally Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (1982) (arguing that monetary damages are preferable to specific
performance).
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In reliance on the contract, the manufacturer then retools its factory
and alters its design schematics to include the part that the supplier
provides. If the supplier breaches the contract, the manufacturer suffers
much higher search costs because it relied on the contract. The
manufacturer now must locate a supplier that supplies not just any part that
serves the function, but a part that fits the other television pieces that the
manufacturer machined to interoperate with the original supplier's parts.
Thus, parties can recover some search costs under the rubric of the reliance
interest in contract.
To summarize, the common law inefficiently subsidizes negotiation by
applying negotiation-specific doctrines to the entire spectrum of contracts,
including searched-for terms. On the other hand, some common law
contract doctrines covertly have worked to lower search costs for contracting
parties or implicitly weigh search costs in deciding on a remedy after breach.
The next Part examines what the common law might look like if courts
explicitly included search interests in the contractual calculus.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING A SEARCH THEORY OF CONTRACT
The adoption of a search-oriented theory of contract would change very
little on the surface of the law. Courts would continue to use traditional
doctrines but would perhaps gain a renewed understanding of their own
role in interpreting contract language. Remedies would have the same
names, but courts might tailor them to the cost of the parties in searching
for a prospective counterparty or term, rather than tailoring them to the
cost of the parties' negotiations. Thus, a search theory of contract would
clarify the role of rules already in place, as well as give courts guidance on
how to achieve their current goals.
A. INTERPRETIVE RULES AND REMEDIES WouLD CHANGE
This Article does not suggest a radical change in the law. As previously
discussed, search-friendly rules and remedies are not incompatible with
common law doctrine. Search-oriented contracts are only one end of the
spectrum: The traditional doctrines provide good rules for negotiated
agreements. That said, courts that view contracts through the lens of search
are likely to retune their interpretive rules and remedies. While the above
sections have identified areas of the common law that already show, sub
silencio, sensitivity to search in the common law of contract, the following
sections discuss some ways the lens of search might alter the perceptions of
courts dealing with contractual disputes.
1. Interpretive Rules: Examples
As discussed above, interpretive rules might well change if courts view
contracts through the lens of search. One valuable contribution that search
theory could make to contract interpretation is a coherent framework for
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separating out standardized contracts that seek to obscure contractual terms
from standardized contracts that enhance the ability of parties to search
their terms.
For example, a court might choose to give extra weight to a term that
not only is standardized by industry standards but also is standardized for
searchability. One could imagine a series of "check-boxes" in a contract,
each check standing for a standardized, and therefore easily searchable,
contractual term. Parties could search a range of contracts by checking the
boxes that represent the terms they desired. The search engine could then
search through the set of contracts on offer to find the terms the searcher
desired. In such a case, the court could have strong confidence in its
obligation to enforce the term. The search-optimized contract term could be
the new initialed or bolded contract term meme for modernized
contracting. Just as an initialed contract term might be a negotiation
marker, the search-optimized contract term would be a search marker.
Another interpretive rule that courts might reimagine under the search
lens of contracting would be contra proferendum, the canon of construing a
contract term against the party that wrote it. 12 The question of who drafted a
searched contract term is odd: The term became part of the contract not
just because one party offered it, but also because another party searched for
it. In that case, the authorship of the searching party is at least as important
to the contract as is the drafting by the offering party. Of course, these
interpretive shifts do not supersede courts' determinations of
reasonableness. If Party A puts out a term that looks like a standardized
term, but has a non-standard qualification such that it would deceive Party
B, a searcher using regular terms, courts can intervene. Nonetheless, the
basic principle remains: A "meeting of the searches" is a bilateral contract-
authoring process in a way that the negotiation model always aspired to be
but never achieved. When one party searches for a term (or offers a term for
search) and enters into a contract based on that search, it might prove
beneficial to a court to hold that party to that term with especial firmness.
As a third example, courts fill in missing terms of contracts after
hearing evidence of industry custom and practice or trade usage. 1 4 Yet
courts have not been able to provide a satisfactory explanation for why they
do so. If the term or its definition were that important to the regular
123. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 8, at 16 (noting that computer searching of contract
provisions "should lower the relative disadvantage faced by less informed parties, in the long
run reducing the need for protective interpretive doctrines such as contra proferendum
(construing the contract against the drafter), as well as information-forcing doctrines such as
unilateral mistake").
124. See, e.g., Sun Oil Trading Co. of Pa. v. M/T "Mercedes Maria," C.A. No. 81-1033, -1083,
-4021, -4862, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17866, at *3 (E.D. Penn. Dec. 29, 1982) (determining that
where international fuel shortages had caused parties to begin challenging the amount of
wastage of oil during shipment by tanker, an implied contract term permitting 0.5% waste
could be read to supplement oil contracts of carriage).
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functioning of the contract, the parties would have expressly included it.125
Moreover, in a negotiation model, parties will, in the future, negotiate the
previously unaddressed provision. Contracting costs will rise. Of course,
there is no real going-forward benefit for the actual parties before the
court-they did not include the provision, and so one side or the other will
get a windfall. This is not an attractive proposition to a court.
A search-oriented analysis makes sense of the practice of supplementing
contract terms in light of industry custom. While it makes very little sense
from a negotiation standpoint to include by implication a clause that the
parties simply chose not to include, from a search standpoint the
enforcement of customary terms lowers the costs for third parties engaged
in searches of contracts and searches for prospective counterparties. Thus,
in this case, the lens of search permits courts to ascertain more clearly when
they ought to permit custom and practice evidence to supplement or define
contract terms.
These are just several examples-there are more. What is important
and valuable about these examples is that they use the lens of search not to
overturn the basic principles of the interpretive rules, but rather to permit
the interpretive rule to fulfill its original common-sense function without
recourse to legal fictions.
2. Remedies: Examples
Similarly, the lens of search might cause courts to reevaluate
contractual remedies in certain circumstances. Courts undercompensate
search costs because they often consider such costs to be precontractual.
Common law courts disfavor precontractual liability."' Under current
doctrine, it is quite possible that a court seeking to compensate a wronged
party for its contracting costs would simply recompense that party for
negotiation costs and not at all for the precontractual search. If the bad acts
in the precontractual moment led to a failure of the contracting process, it is
quite possible that the harmed party would have no contract cause of action
at all.
125. Again, a standard law-and-economics analysis would state that the term was not
included because the costs of specification were greater than the surplus created by settling the
negotiated term. This is satisfying in that parties cannot specify absolutely everything, and
sometimes the facts put pressure on little-considered clauses. Beyond that, the analysis is
flawed-if an industry-standard term is actually industry standard such that the meaning is
lexical, or the parties are to imply the term in the contract, then the term omission is clearly an
act of contractual significance. If facts conspire to make a clause leap into the spotlight, it
becomes a drafting issue, not an ongoing issue of contract law. Parties will simply contract
around the problem in the future.
126. Compare the tradition of permitting civil actions for bad acts in the precontractual
phase (culpa in contrahendo). See generally Nadia E. Nedzel, A Comparative Study of Good Faith, Fair
Dealing, and Precontractual Liability, 12 TUL. EUR. & CIrv. L.F. 97, 112-13 (1997) (discussing culpa
in contrahendo in a civil-law context).
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A search-oriented approach to contract might enable courts to
compensate parties for precontractual bad acts, especially bad information
that led a party to undertake opportunity costs and stop its search for other
contractual counterparties. Indeed, when given a pretext, courts recognize
such costs under the doctrine of good faith. For example, a court
considering an attempt by a supplier of steel to raise prices to its buyer mid-
contract determined that the buyer was not able to find another supplier of
steel in time to meet its production schedules. 127 Thus, the court decided
that the supplier acted in bad faith in raising the price and that the contract
modification was unenforceable.2 2 The court's application of the good-faith
requirement was illogical: Good faith is not a requirement during contract
• • 129
negotiation. However, search costs for replacements had risen because of
lock-in effects caused by reliance on the supply contract." ° The court
therefore employed the doctrine of good faith as a quasi-culpa in contrahendo
doctrine to respond to these shifting costs.
The view of the remedy of specific performance also might change if
courts explicitly recognize the role of search in contracting behavior. As
discussed above, the current rule at common law is that courts disfavor
specific performance when recovery at law is available. This view presumes
low search costs, such that courts might use money to make the harmed
party whole. If search costs are high, courts adopting a search-sensitive view
of contract might permit specific performance in more scenarios. For
example, if costly permits and clearances are necessary in order to import
certain goods, it may be impossible to compensate a party for the loss of a
contract because no other counterparty could obtain the clearances in a
timely manner. Courts then might order the goods imported and later let
the parties go their separate ways. Indeed, in the international arena, this is
already the rule: Specific performance is the default remedy in cross-border
transactions under the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods.' 3 1 It is not implausible that common law courts seeking to
compensate parties for extensive search costs might adopt similar rules.
127. See Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 147-48 (6th Cir. 1983).
128. Id. at 148.
129. See, e.g., GILLETrE & WALT, supra note 64, at 91 ("Strictly, good faith under the U.C.C.
is limited to good faith in the performance and enforcement of a contract. Good faith in
modification goes to the formation of the modified contract, not its performance or
enforcement.").
130. See Roth Steel, 705 F.2d at 148.
131. Avery W. Katz, Remedies for Breach of Contract Under the CISG, 25 INT'L REv. L. & ECON.
378, 384 (2006).
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B. THE Focus OF CONSUMER PROTECTION THROUGH
CONTRA CT DOCTRINE MAY CHANGE
One strong trend in contract law is the view that standardized contracts,
or take-it-or-leave-it deals, make it hard for consumers to get information
about the deals to which they nominally are agreeing. Only in the law of
contract would one posit that standardization raises information costs. In
every other field and discipline, the information benefits of standardization
• / 132
are commonly accepted.
Standardized contracts became vilified as anti-consumer because of
attempts to protect consumers through the law of contract rather than
through separate consumer-protection statutes. Even if one does want to
protect consumers, controlling contract terms by legislative fiat is a poor way
of reaching those distributional goals. Where law dictates contract terms,
price terms make up the difference. Thus, distributionally, most attempts to
route consumer protection through contract legislation or judicial
construction tend to fail.
133
Despite this failure, nearly every discussion of standardized contracting
discusses the following paradigmatic hypothetical: A party presents a
consumer with a long and confusing standardized contract that includes
provisions the consumer neither expected nor desired. 13 4 Confronted with
the prospect of spending a long period of time examining a document that
governs eventualities the consumer hopes will not materialize, the consumer
opts not to read the document. 13 5 There have been two traditional solutions:
(1) a legislature dictates the contractual term, or (2) the court determines
whether the consumer has consented to the transaction.
136
Courts often hold standardized contracts to a different standard
because they deem that consumers have not consented to the deal.1 37 But,
132. For example, no one would claim that the standardization of a three-pronged plug for
an outlet somehow was a bad thing for consumers. The standardization of the plug and the wall
socket lowers information costs, making the consumer's search for a plug easier. It is worth
asking why the same has not held true, to date, for standardized contracts.
133. Katz, supra note 8, at 11.
134. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1174, 1176-79 (1983) (developing a model of modern contract-of-adhesion law).
135. See Knapp, supra note 100, at 794-95 (noting that parties do not read adhesion
contracts, even where parties use information-forcing mechanisms like term initialing); Rakoff,
supra note 134, at 1179 ("[T]he adhering party is in practice unlikely to have read the standard
terms before signing the document and is unlikely to have understood them if he has read
them.").
136. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450-51 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding consumer's
failure to return item after opening it sufficient to establish consent to contract); U.C.C. § 2-
719(3) (2003) (providing that attempts to limit personal injuries are "prima facie
unconscionable").
137. See Rakoff, supra note 134, at 1174-75 (arguing that contracts of adhesion receive
different treatment under the common law).
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when a consumer agrees to a standardized contract despite limited
information, the consumer is often perfectly aware that information is
limited. The consumer has made an informed guess as to the costs and
benefits of inquiring further. Parties routinely offer consent based on
limited information. When consumers trust a doctor or a financial expert, or
mail a letter, or start a car without intimate knowledge of the workings of the
internal combustion engine, they work with very good knowledge about
their relative lack of knowledge. Consent is not vitiated merely because it is
premised on the consenting parties' accurate self-assessment of limited
knowledge.
3 8
A theory of search improves the lot of contracting consumers without
obfuscating the benefits of searchable contracts. Parties seeking to contract
need to ascertain that there are no unpleasant surprises within the contract.
One of the ways they can do that is by perusing the document; this is the
approach to which even the "pro-standardization" theories ascribe. There is
never any negative characterization of the decision of the consumer to read
the document, even among the proponents of standard-form contracts as
purveyors of efficient allocation of risk among the contracting parties.
Yet at least some theory of contract ought to be incensed when
consumers are required to read contracts. The cost of doing so is
considerable, especially as a proportion of the expected gain to be realized
out of the trade. Let us say a consumer values his time at ten dollars per
hour. If a contractual relationship takes an hour to fully comprehend, a
consumer faced with even a pro-standardization regime will prefer not to
undertake the trade if he is required to read the contract. Only a search-
centered theory of contract recognizes the reader's loss of time and effort.
V. APPLICATION OF SEARCH-CENTERED REGIMES IN CONTRACT:
ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING AND THE UCC
Thus far, this Article has examined how the law focuses on a
negotiation model of contract, even in areas (such as standardized "money
now, terms later" contracts) where the idea of negotiation seems particularly
inapposite. This Article also has examined closely the common law of
contract and noticed that, although courts do not expressly consider search
costs, many common law doctrines do act to lower search costs. Next, this
Article demonstrated how a search-centered theory of contract might
influence courts to use slightly different interpretive rules or craft slightly
different remedies. This final Part considers whether a search-centered
theory of contract casts any light on two of the most important areas of
138. It is true that making this intuition into a hard-and-fast rule would invite parties to
abuse consumers' lack of knowledge. However, it would do so no more (and probably less) than
the current legal fiction of awareness of, and consent to, contractual terms by consumers.
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evolving contract law: electronic contracting and sales law under the
Uniform Commercial Code.
A. SEARCH COSTS IN ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING
The Internet has not revolutionized contract law any more than it has
revolutionized torts or criminal law.139 However, the Internet has
significantly shifted the way many people contract.1 40 Parties now perform
comparison shopping on auction or aggregation sites. Deals happen more
quickly, over longer distances, and across borders. 14' Computers often take
care of the actual ordering, and machine-made contracts are routine in
industries that use just-in-time inventory methods. 14 The reduction of search
costs occasioned by integrated and computerized networks has shifted
contracting to a strongly search-oriented practice. On the other hand,
negotiation is not a part of the overwhelming majority of online
• 145
transactions. Search engines permit parties to seek the price point, the
139. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207,
208 (noting that the laws of "cyberspace" are about as substantial as the laws of the "horse").
140. David G. Post, Against "Against Cyberanarchy," 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1374
(2002). Post lists some reasons for the shift:
It does not take a great deal of insight or deep thinking to come up with ways in
which activity in cyberspace is functionally not identical to activity in realspace. For
example, in cyberspace, I can communicate an offer to sell some product or
service instantaneously (or nearly so); at zero marginal cost (or nearly so); to
several million people; [and] with near-zero probability of error in the
reproduction or distribution of that offer ....
Id.
141. Jack Goldsmith famously argued that these differences are nonexistent because the
law was quite capable of dealing with cross-border disputes--say, international copyright
disputes-before the advent of networked computer systems. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against
Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199, 1200-02 (1998). That this opinion still commands a
majority in the legal literature is deeply puzzling. To make the argument, one must assume that
the quantity of cross-border transactions has no yield in the quality or cost of cross-border
enforcement. Since this is wrong, Goldsmith's approach seems incomplete.
142. See Radin, supra note 51, at 1140. Radin notes:
Manufacturing is becoming ever more automated, and the advent of the machine-
made contract completes the picture by automating the supply process. If some
computer processor "realizes" that more supplies are needed at a certain part of
the assembly process, it can also search certain suppliers and see which can most
readily supply what is needed, and it can give the go-ahead for the supplies to be
delivered. Computers at each end of the transaction could be programmed with
sets of terms; when the buyer computer encounters a seller computer, they could
enter into a computerized handshake protocol, and if they determine that they
have a set of terms in common they could arrive at a commitment, without a
human being having to sign off on it.
Id.
143. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(discussing the popularity of sites such as eBay where over twenty-five million buyers and sellers
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warranties, the guarantees, and the service they desire not by negotiation,
but by searching and choosing from a range of off-the-shelf options.
144
The following subparts deal with two basic aspects concerning the
impact of technology on contracting behavior. First, new technology permits
faster searches. But this alone does not generate a theory of how the law
ought to respond to the new technology. Second, searching is a bilateral
business: Contracts and products have become search optimized in order to
take the greatest advantage of the new technology.
45
1. The Technology of Search
Networked systems facilitate searches, 146 and computers can search
through pre-set criteria quickly. 147 The harder question, though, is how the
law ought to respond to these shifts in technology. The danger is that by
noting technological shifts, legal analysis might become technologically
deterministic. Too many mediocre legal arguments rely on technological
change. The usefulness of those arguments lasts precisely as long as the
technological shift they address remains current. Thus, the purpose of this
subpart is not to argue that technological change must drive changes in the
law, but rather to identify a continuum of search and negotiation costs that
vary as a function of human contracting behavior and technology.
Searches have become cheaper as a function of networked computer
systems. 14 As each network becomes plugged into the pool, the value of
every networked computer grows. Moreover, searches are themselves
searchable: If an aggregator or auction site like eBay has available searches
for thousands of items, an aggregator of searches can include eBay's
auctions, plus the auctions from a number of other auction sites.149 Searches
are therefore a positive pyramid scheme: the information metastasizes across
the networked system, finally becoming available to the end user at low
cost. 150
of consumer goods and services search for and buy items via either an auction or a fixed-price
format).
144. See, e.g., Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 706 (Ct. App. 2002).
145. Id. at 832; see infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text (discussing Gentry).
146. See Katz, supra note 8, at 16, 29.
147. Id. at 16-20.
148. Of course, technology has made negotiation easier as well, but that was one
communications revolution ago. Technology has added little to the tools of negotiators
following the advent of near-instant person-to-person communication that the telegraph or
telephone accomplished.
149. The practice has caused some legal controversy, leading to a resurrection of the
antiquated trespass-to-chattels tort in the online context. See, e.g., eBay v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F.
Supp. 2d 1058, 1060-61, 1066-67 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
150. For a remarkable example of the effect of pyramidal-information schemes on the price
of information, see Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2007), a vast
information collection assembled at near-zero cost and free to information consumers. The
point is not that Wikipedia itself is interesting or useful. Rather, the point is that it was
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The benefits of search are not only high, they are easily available to
prospective searchers. Because of easy access and low cost, search engines
have become part of consumers' everyday lives. AOL recently mistakenly
released a massive archive of search queries from AOL users, which revealed
precisely what AOL users had been searching for.1 " The data indicates that
parties use search engines to find information on every sort of topic:
shopping, sex, personal acquaintances, hobby or historical interests,
religion, and more. 152 The AOL data, and the analysis built upon it, show
that consumers use search engines reflexively-often before using any other
method (such as consulting with another person). Familiarity, in turn,
breeds use. Because search engines fill so many roles in users' lives, it is
unsurprising that consumers increasingly use search engines to satisfy their
commercial needs.
The growth of networked systems has not only changed what and how
much people search, but it also has changed the balance between search
and negotiation. Consumers can conduct more deals that previously
required customized contracting via search. Niche markets that would
previously have been unsustainable are now profitable. For example, if a
party desired to purchase a non-standard-length pool table for her small
basement, she might once have had to order a custom-built table. However,
with the growth of niche markets fueled by searchable networked systems,
the purchaser might now search for a manufacturer that has found it
profitable to have a limited run of non-standard pool tables.1
53
A search-oriented theory of contract suggests a way that the law can
respond to these changing realities. Rather than passing statutes that lag
behind technology and are obsolete by the time they are promulgated, it
might be preferable to adapt common law rules that vindicate the decisions
contracting parties currently are making.
2. Search Optimization and Contract
Technology alone does not entirely, or even mostly, account for the
very real rise in the search capability of the Internet. Technology is limited-
computers can only search for predefined parameters. Anyone who has
become frustrated using a search engine realizes the limitations of
assembled in the face of what ought to be insurmountable transaction costs. Please note that
references to Wikipedia in this Article are used only for purposes of demonstrating the use of
these terms within the computer-literate community of search optimizers, and not, as it were,
for the truth of the matter asserted.
151. See Paul Boutin, You Are What You Search, SLATE, Aug. 11, 2006, http://www.slate.com/
id/2147590.
152. Id. (setting forth different types of search profiles from AOL user data); see also
Valleywag, http://www.valleywag.com/tech/aol/aol-creepy-user-watch-volume-9-193364.php
(last visited Feb. 6, 2007) (serving as a clearinghouse for AOL user-profile information).
153. See, e.g., The Factory Outlet, Selecting the Right Size Pool Table for Your Home,
http://www.thefactoryoutlet.com/pool-table/table-size.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
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computerized searches. 5 4 In a very real way, a computer can only find
something that a human has already found and made searchable in some
way. This process is called "search optimization."' 55 It is worth first discussing
the present phenomenon of search optimization and then tying the practice
back into contract law.
If a person searches Google for television sets, Google selects the first
ten results that appear to the user based on search optimization. Search
optimization is the practice of making a website particularly readable to the
computer programs that scan the Web, cataloguing key words and content,
and reporting back to the search engines. 156 Website owners often "submit"
their sites to the search engine-that is, submit a request that a program re-
scan their website and see what it has to offer. 157 Search optimization
therefore requires a balance between what people will want to search for
and what the software that scans the site will be able to read and correctly
categorize, so as to give searching parties access to it.
58
The party offering the information very much determines searchability.
That party both has responsibility for, and derives benefit from, the
searchability of its offer. 59 For example, in Gentry v. eBay, the court
determined that when an individual seller placed his merchandise in a false
search category, the search category was part of the contract, and the
individual seller made the false representation.'6 Thus, an individual seller
154. A simple example involves computer searches using "spell checking" software. The
spellchecker is limited in its ability to search context: If the word "for" is misspelled "fore," it
will go undetected because the computer has not yet been told that that is an incorrect use of
the term.
155. See generally Wikipedia, Search Optimization, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search-
engine-optimization (last visited Feb. 6, 2007) (providing an overview of search engine
optimization).
156. Id. ("Search engine optimization .. as a subset of search engine marketing seeks to
improve the number and quality of visitors to a website . . . [by making the search results]
'natural'.....).
157. See, e.g., AddPro.com, http://www.addpro.com (last visited Feb. 6, 2007);
BuildTraffic.com, http://www.buildtraffic.com (last visited Feb. 6, 2007); Ultimate Promotion,
ProSubmit, http://ultimatepromotion.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2007); Submit Express, http://
www.submitexpress.com (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
158. The latter task commonly is referred to as categorizing the "metadata." See, e.g.,
Wikipedia, Metadata, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metadata (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
159. See, e.g., Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 708-09 (Ct. App. 2002). Plaintiffs
alleged that eBay was responsible for categorizing items under the subcategory "SPORTS:
Autographs;" and that, as a result, eBay was liable for memorabilia that was not in fact
autographed. Id. The court noted that the individual sellers of the items were the ones who had
set the search categories of the memorabilia and, thus, were the parties bound by those search
categories. Id.
160. Id. at 823-24. In describing how eBay operates, the court noted:
Members who wished to place an item for sale on eBay would themselves choose
the main category (e.g., "Sports") and subcategories (e.g., "Autographs") under
which their item would be listed for sale. Thereafter, the Website would prompt
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who set the category for an item of phony sports memorabilia to "SPORTS:S 161 ro 162
Autographs" was responsible for that representation, and eBay was not.
The importance of this and similar decisions is two-fold: First, the court
deemed unilateral, pre-contractual behavior-the selection of a search
category-as central to the contract; and second, the person who selected
the category is primarily liable, rather than the entity that created the search
categories. 163
Websites are another form of free-floating contract, discoverable by
search. Many terms of use or terms of service bind parties merely because
those parties browse the website.164 Every time a party searches for a website
and then navigates to that website, it enters into a contract.165 For example,
by navigating and using eBay's service, you agree to its terms of use. Some of
the seller to provide other information, including the title and description of the
item. eBay requested that the court take judicial notice under Evidence Code
section 452, subdivision (h) of the fact "[a] user listing an item for sale on eBay's
web site selects the category and subcategory under which her item will appear on
eBay's web site."
Id. (alteration in original).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 824. This is consistent with courts' general practice of deeming an internet
service provider immune from suit where it does not select the content on its website but
merely acts as a forum or conduit. See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119,
1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a matchmaker website's structure of information and
searches did not make it responsible for the content of its users); Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d
465, 470-71 (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding AOL's immunity from a third party's transmission of
defamatory messages and a program designed to disrupt the recipient's computer); Corbis
Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1098 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (holding service
provider Amazon.com immune from suit over third-party content posted in its zShops.com
forum).
163. See, e.g., Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124-25. The court noted:
We also note that, as with eBay, Matchmaker's decision to structure the
information provided by users allows the company to offer additional features,
such as "matching" profiles with similar characteristics or highly structured
searches based on combinations of multiple choice questions. Without
standardized, easily encoded answers, Matchmaker might not be able to offer these
services and certainly not to the same degree.
Id.
164. Of course, while the positive aspects of websites are well publicized and searchable,
negative aspects routinely are hidden deep in non-optimized contracts. Terms of Service are
not optimized but are binding. Under a search theory of contract, it may well be that the non-
optimization of terms of service would serve as grounds for discounting the provisions.
165. See Ann Bartow, Remarks at the Privacy and Security Session, Colloquium on the
Digital Frontier: The Buffalo Summit 2001 (Nov. 3, 2001), in 50 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 723-24
(2002) (indicating that if companies have privacy policies "they must at least comply with their
own policies," and when a party voluntarily adopts that policy, she is bound).
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these terms extend to third-party contracts and set the rules for the
environment in which eBay users contract with each other.
66
Optimization works equally well for aggregation and auction sites,
where parties rapidly compare terms or scan many different goods being
offered. Parties routinely search for offers; whether they see an offer often
depends on whether the offeror optimized for searches. Thus, including the
correct words in the offer, or selecting the appropriate category for the
offer, can directly drive the number of bids the offer obtains.
1 67
There are several implications of search optimization for contract
theory. First, search is not an entirely unilateral process. The offering party
can hide or optimize terms for searches. The traditional characterization of
search costs as being unilaterally incurred is the greatest stumbling block to
recognition of searches in contract. However, by recognizing the degree of
agency available to the party searched, one can begin to understand that
searches are a bilateral activity. ' 68 Thus, the degree of optimization ought to
play into a court's decision regarding enforceability.
The second implication of search optimization for contract law is to
solve the problem of the unsearchable contract. The nascent literature of
search has noted that computers could indeed facilitate fast searches of
contracts because computers read documents quickly. 69 The problem has
always been, however, that computers cannot read documents unless they
seek predefined parameters. 17 If a party inserts a non-standard term into a
document, the computer may not recognize that term.'
166. See, e.g., Foster-Gwin, Inc. v. Fallwell, No. C 01-03068 WHA, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18151, at *7 (N. D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2001). A description of eBay's ground rules for contracts with
third parties states:
3.1 Online Auctions. Although we are commonly referred to as an online auction
web site, it is important to realize that we are not a traditional "auctioneer."
Instead, our site acts as a venue to allow anyone to offer, sell, and buy just about
anything, at anytime, from anywhere, in a variety of formats, including a fixed
price format and an auction-style format commonly referred to as an "online
auction." We are not involved in the actual transaction between buyers and sellers.
As a result, we have no control over the quality, safety, or legality of the items
advertised, the truth or accuracy of the listings, the ability of sellers to sell items or
the ability of buyers to buy items. We cannot ensure that a buyer or seller will
actually complete a transaction.
Id.
167. See Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 707-09 (Ct. App. 2002) (noting that
eBay provides such tools in order to "better enable users to place items for sale on its site").
168. And, of course, negotiation in most modern contracts is a legal fiction and is entirely
unilateral.
169. See Katz, supra note 8, at 16.
170. Id. at 29.
171. See Gentry, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 708-09 (discussing how sellers describe and categorize
their products).
1280 [2007]
THE SEARCH INTEREST IN CONTRACT
However, the answer to the problem of searchability is to recognize that
humans can and will make contracts searchable with the right incentives. If
courts recognize the value of search optimization for contracting parties, the
practice will become even more widespread. Bold type or capital letters were
the old means of rendering a term prominent and easily searched by the
human eye. Correct categorization (e.g., a television set listed in the
"electronics" category of eBay), correct matching by keyword ("television,"
"t.v.," "TV," "Magnavox"), and other search optimizations are, in other
circumstances, more effective. The contract is no longer being read by a
human, but by a machine following human instruction. The justification for
the rules has not changed. Initialing draws a human's attention to a specific
contractual provision, while search optimization makes it simpler for a
computer to flag the specific provision so that the contracting party will take
note.
Courts cannot affect technology directly, but they can alter the
incentives to engage in certain kinds of contracting behavior. The Internet
enables faster searches not purely because machines are fast, but because
contract offerors value the searchability of the information they place into
the network. If courts do not recognize searched-for terms, contracting
parties will inefficiently avoid search optimization. Likewise, if courts do not
validate searched-for terms, such as the search category of an eBay purchase,
purchasers will take expensive precautions or will sub-optimally invest in
search activity. In short, the search benefits of networked computers are not
emergent characteristics of technology. The benefits are derived from
human behavior, and thus, courts can either validate or undercut that
behavior by altering the incentives to search.
B. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, STANDARDIZATION, CUSTOM AND PRACTICE,
AND THE BA TTLE OF THE FORMS
The Internet is one search-centered contractual medium, but hardly the
only one. The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") Article 2, governing
sales of goods in all fifty states, is an admixture of law, theory, and industry
practice that has an overarching goal of lowering the costs of commercial
transactions. If anywhere, we ought to expect to see search interests weighed
in the UCC and in UCC-governed transactions.
Article 2 has been criticized for insufficiently tracking the will of the
parties to make individualized transactions because it provides default
provisions and non-disclaimable warranties. 112 For example, scholars have
172. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the
Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1251 (1982) ("The cost of off-the-rack
provisions is that they supply, or allow courts to supply, inefficient terms in some cases. But
many who extoll the virtue of the Code for supplying terms whenever the parties do not reach
explicit agreement do not appreciate this cost."); Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms
in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678, 2689 (2000) ("[A]n even more fundamental concern with the
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criticized the so-called "battle of the forms," whereby parties form contracts
from the set of common terms searched and offered, while neither party
assents to the entirety of the other's offer because it does not correspond to
any coherent concept of negotiated consent. The UCC focuses less on
individuals and more on the contracting community, by placing a strong
emphasis on evidence of industry custom and practice.
174
If we use a search lens of contract, these provisions of the UCC begin to
make sense. The UCC's provisions streamline the process of searching for
and finding a contractual counterparty while limiting the range and role of
negotiation. If standardized provisions are the bedrock of a given
contractual relationship, then making them non-optional lowers search costs
(if a warranty is non-disclaimable, then parties do not have to search
contracts for disclaimers). A search-centered approach to contract can help
us make sense of the successes of the UCC while permitting us to suggest
some areas in need of tuning.
1. Article 2 Lowers Search Costs Ex Ante
The UCC has adopted several rules that directly lower search costs for
contracting parties during the search for an acceptable deal. The two rules
discussed here are the UCC's liberal use of industry custom and practice to
define contractual terms 75 and the UCC's "battle of the forms" provision,
which lowers search costs by limiting contracts to the terms for which the
parties were searching.' 
76
The UCC makes a point of including evidence of industry custom and
practice to clarify contract terms. 77 Custom and practice is the traditional
means whereby courts incorporate the community lexicon into contracts
and, as such, is a search-friendly rule. In the common law context, courts
often use the parol-evidence and four-corners doctrines to limit the reach
default mechanism of the current battle of the forms is not that it favors buyers, but rather that
it yields terms that may be in neither party's interest.").
173. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 172, at 1249-50.
174. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-207 (2003). Comment 5 to UCC section 2-207 states:
Examples of clauses which involve no element of unreasonable surprise and which
therefore are to be incorporated in the contract unless notice of objection is
seasonably given are: . . . a clause providing for interest on overdue invoices or
fixing the seller's standard credit terms where they are within the range of trade
practice and do not limit any credit bargained for; [and] a clause limiting the right
of rejection for defects which fall within the customary trade tolerances for
acceptance "with adjustment" or otherwise limiting remedy in a reasonable
manner.
Id. at cmt. 5 (citing id. §§ 2-718, -719).
175. Id. § 1-303(d)-(g) (2005).
176. Id. § 2-207 (2003).
177. Id. § 1-303(d)-(g) (2005).
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and applicability of such industry evidence. 78 However, the UCC's reliance
on custom-and-practice evidence permits the broader contracting
community to participate in the construction of contract language that may
affect the community as a whole.
179
This, in turn, lowers search costs ex ante for third parties seeking
prospective contracting counterparties. By enforcing industry-standard
terms, courts applying Article 2 give third parties the assurance they need to
enter into their own transactions. This is more than the parties' assurance
that courts will construe contracts in a predictable way if the parties pursue
litigation. Rather, third parties gain from lower search costs outside of
litigation: The resulting unification of language makes it easier for parties to
determine whether they can get what they want without engaging in costly
negotiation.
The UCC lowers search costs for ex ante searchers in other ways. One
much-discussed feature of Article 2 is the "battle of the forms" provision,
which assembles a contract out of the mutually-agreed-upon portions of
forms exchanged by parties, whether or not either party has consented to
the whole. 80 Although the provision has been revised as part of the Article 2
revision process, the fundamental character of the rule remains the same: A
contract may be formed that consists neither of the set of terms offered, nor
of the set of terms set forth in an acceptance."" Indeed, the revision
178. See, e.g., Air Safety v. Teachers Realty Corp., 706 N.E.2d 882, 884-86 (Ill. 1999);
Eichengreen v. Rollins, Inc., 757 N.E.2d 952, 958 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). See generally Marie
Adornetto Monahan, Survey of Illinois Law: Contracts-The Disagreement Over Agreements: The
Conflict in Illinois Law Regarding the Parol Evidence Rule and Contract Interpretation, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J.
687 (2003).
179. See U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (2005) (indicating that trade usage and course of dealing should
be used to construe contract terms).
180. Id. § 2-207(1)-(2) (2003). The pre-revision Article 2 of the UCC reads, in part:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it
states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given within a
reasonable time after notice of them has been received.
Id.
181. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (2005). As of the time of this Article, no state has adopted the
approved revisions of Article 2. Revised section 2-207 still determines that a contract may be
formed out of records that might otherwise be inadequate to create a contract, even when
additional or differing terms are offered.
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strengthens the "knockout rule," which removes differing terms between
offeror and acceptor and supplants those terms with default rules.
18 2
The provisions of the UCC that permit contract formation without the
parties' assent to a single set of terms and conditions have been routinely
criticized as inefficient because they hamper bilaterally contracting parties'
ability to craft the bargains they desire.'83 But the battle of the forms is, in
fact, a search-cost-reducing rule. A form is a kind of search: A party searches
for a counterparty that matches the desired contractual terms. Imagine a
computer that has a database of all prospective contracts on offer. A party
could enter the terms of the contract that she wants and have the computer
search for offers that matched the desired contractual terms. That party
would then have a contract by virtue of search rather than negotiation.
The battle of the forms is like a peer-to-peer search for a contracting
partner. Where the terms of the offer and acceptance do not precisely
match, the rule attempts to make them match unless either party indicates
that they do not wish to benefit from a broad search. In the battle-of-the-
forms context, the contract offer and acceptance are like Internet dating.
The dating service matches one profile to another and finds the greatest
common ground to see if there can be a profitable match. No two profiles
will match in every respect, so the dating service streamlines the searches so
that general matches will be able to get together. This is precisely what the
battle of the forms does, with the additional advantage of not needing a
computerized database. The contract "returned" by the battle of the forms
consists of the search terms that matched on both sides of the equation-the
result of two searches and matches.
This is not to say that the battle of the forms cannot usefully be read in
.... 184
other ways or that it cannot validly be criticized. For example, many courts
have read the rule to "knock out" differing provisions. s5 The default rules in
182. See id.
183. See generally Alex Devience, Jr., The Renewed Search for the "Bargain in Fact" Under the
U.C.C. Section 2-207." Battle of the Forms, Part II, 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 349 (1997); Victor P.
Goldberg, The "Battle of the Forms":- Fairness, Efficiency, and the Best-Shot Rule, 76 OR. L. REV. 155
(1997); Keating, supra note 172, at 2688-90; Daniel T. Ostas & Frank P. Darr, Redrafling U.C.C.
Section 2-207: An Economic Prescription for the Battle of the Forms, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 403 (1996).
184. Of course, scholars adopting the traditional law-and-economics approach might
criticize the above analysis on more-or-less libertarian grounds: The parties are being forced
into an agreement to which neither had consented. This view is mired in the negotiation model
of contract. If we do believe that parties painstakingly and solely negotiate contractual
provisions, then of course we ought not to enforce a searched but non-negotiated deal. I
cheerfully concede to the critics in this minute percentage of cases.
185. See Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that
where a buyer's purchase order contained different terms than those contained in seller's offer,
the "knockout rule" applied and operated to cancel out the different terms); Richardson v.
Union Carbide Indus. Gases, Inc., 790 A.2d 962, 966-67, 969 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
(noting that the knockout rule was adopted for conflicting terms in contracts governed by New
Jersey's UCC and holding that the application of that rule to a contract regarding the purchase
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the UCC replace knocked-out provisions.8 6 Thus, when parties offer
differing terms, they may end up with final terms that neither one of them
wanted.'87 Indeed, despite the criticism of the knockout rule, the proposed
revision of section 2-207 clarifies the language in favor of knockout. 88
The knockout rule certainly raises frustration costs because it prevents
parties from seeking precisely the bargains they desire. Are there
recognizable efficiency gains from the knockout rule? A comparison to
property theory helps. The knockout rule constrains the set of contracts
available to parties to one of two categories: (1) a standardized-contract set
that has been developed by the industry (i.e., the terms of both offer and
acceptance match); or (2) the default rules provided by the UCC. Either
way, the parties benefit from low search costs. In the property context, one
can be sure that the property will fall into one of a closed set of property
types. Likewise, under the UCC's knockout rule, the parties can be sure that
their contract will also be one of a closed set-either one familiar to them by
industry, or one supplied by the UCC. Thus, it seems at least plausible that
search-cost reduction is one of the reasons that the knockout rule, although
so often criticized, remains a staple of the UCC.
2. Article 2 Presumes Low Search Costs Ex Post by
Limiting Remedies and Requiring Cover
The UCC not only works to lower search costs but also banks on low
search costs by encouraging parties to search where search costs are low. In a
market for fungible goods, courts can reasonably expect repeat players-
such as merchants-to find someone else to provide what they need at an
acceptable cost.Is9 The UCC therefore disfavors specific performance as a
remedy.'9° Instead, Article 2 offers the remedy of substitute performance-
cover for a buyer or resale for a seller.'9 1 The UCC encourages a party
suffering a breach to attempt to find another contractual counterparty.192
If Party A breaches with Party B, Party B may, without otherwise
prejudicing its remedies, solve its problem as cheaply as possible by
immediately covering and then seeking the difference between the contract
of furnace parts meant that conflicting indemnification provisions were not part of the
contract); Flender Corp. v. Tippins Int'l, Inc., 830 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)
(holding that differing terms regarding the arbitrability of a dispute in an offer and an invoice
between the purchaser and seller caused both terms to be knocked out).
186. See supra note 180.
187. See Keating, supra note 172, at 2689.
188. See supra note 180.
189. See Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465, 467 (1857) ("All five contracts grow out of the
intentions of the parties to transactions.").
190. U.C.C. § 2-716 (2003).
191. Seeid.§§2-712,-706.
192. Id.; see also id. § 2-610 (discussing remedies in the context of anticipatory repudiation).
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and cover prices from Party A. 193 If Party B can make the problem go away
entirely by contracting with a third party for a price point equal to or below
that of Party A, then the UCC encourages Party B to take that route.
1 94
Although a price point better than the market price is possible, it rarely
occurs because parties who have contracts that beat market prices tend to
hold up their end of the bargain in the hopes of enforcing the contract.
Thus, the UCC's preferred remedy for high negotiation costs (fixing a
current broken contract) is to replace the counterparty through low search
costs (finding another counterparty).
But the remedy of substitute performance is only attractive if the costs
of searching a prospective counterparty are relatively low. The party can,
after all, seek other remedies under the UCC. The party will compare the
cost of securing substitute performance, which the victim of breach pays out-
of-pocket and up front, with the expense of having a trier of fact set a
market price. 195 Only where the expected cost of substitution is lower than
the cost of proof will substitution be an attractive remedy.
196
By comparison, the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods ("CISG") presumes a quite different set of search costs. 97 The
CISG gives specific performance as a remedy for contractual violations.
98
When a party contracts across international borders, it may engage in
expensive searches to find a cross-border partner that provides the desired
commodity. 99 If a party contracts with a foreign partner and there is a
breach of contract, a replacement may be quite difficult to find. CISG's
remedy of specific performance may reflect the realities of these searches. If
finding an alternative contracting party is quite expensive, specific
performance is the preferred remedy to compensate for the higher search
costs.
2 00
193. See id. § 2-712(3) ("Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar
him from any other remedy.").
194. See id. § 2-712.
195. See GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 64, at 331. ("[Substitute transactions] enable the
party to avoid having a trier of fact determine market price-a determination that is sometimes
costly to prove.").
196. Id. at 332 ("Fixing damages by resale or cover can be costly to the aggrieved party,
however .... At the same time, by fixing its damages the seller avoids incurring the costs of
proving market price.").
197. Katz, supra note 131, at 385.
198. Id. at 383 ("The international nature of CISG transactions affects relative transaction
costs in a number of overlapping ways. It is... more costly to communicate information before
and during exchange (especially when the greater risk of miscommunication is counted as a
cost) . . ").
199. Id. ("It is . . . more costly to monitor the performance and reliability of contractual
partners [in CISG transactions], and more costly to litigate and settle disputes.").
200. Id. at 386 ("In general, greater relational investment, by reducing the substitutability
of alternative contractual partners, also favors the greater use of specific performance.").
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3. Article 2 and Online Transactions
Search theory can also help explain two of the principle oddities of
transactions in software: (1) why Article 2 of the UCC has been selected to
govern licenses of intellectual property (software), and (2) why contracts for
the customization of software fail at extremely high rates. This section
discusses each of these in turn, using search theory to explain their
persistence.
One strange fact of modern Internet law is the adoption of Article 2 of
the UCC, governing the sale of goods, to govern contracts that address
licenses of software.20' The majority of states declined to adopt the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA"), which applied the
UCC's lenient approach of standardization to "mass market transactions" in
202
computer software. However, what the states chose not to do by statute,
courts have opted to do as a matter of common law. Although numerous
courts have passed on the question as to exactly why the UCC's sale-of-goods
provisions apply to software-licensing contracts, almost all have decided to
do so.
It is not immediately clear that such courts are correct. There are
serious questions regarding the democratic legitimacy of adopting a
statutory scheme as a matter of common law. Such a statutory scheme would
govern concerns beyond those raised by the parties in any given case. But
questions of the wisdom of importing statutory regimes that have not been
voted upon to new areas via the common law aside, there remains the
question: Why do courts think that the sales provisions of UCC Article 2 are
so salutary for the sale of license rights in intellectual property?
At first blush, the two areas seem to have nothing in common. License
rights remain attached to the licensee and also likely run with subsequent
purchasers of the software.203 Most client-side programs have significant
interaction with server-side components controlled by the software
201. See, e.g., Warren E. Agin & Scott N. Kumis, A Framework for Understanding Electronic
Information Transactions, 15 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 277, 299 (2005) (discussing courts'
application of Article 2 to off-the-shelf contracts but reluctance to do the same for software-
customization deals); see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997)
(applying UCC to a software-licensing case); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th
Cir. 1996) (same).
202. Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1449, 1474 n.89
(2004) ("Although UCITA was adopted in two states, Virginia and Maryland, such has been the
fury of opposition to its enactment elsewhere that the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws has now abandoned efforts to promote its further adoption." (citing
Michael Wanecke, UCITA Drafters Ditch Licensing Act as Ahead of Its Time, Politically DOA, 8
ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 771 (2003))); see also Radin, supra note 51, at 1129 (noting that
only two states, Maryland and Virginia, have passed the UCITA).
203. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
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creator.204 Thus, regardless of who buys the client-side program from whom,
a court is likely to hold the license agreement viable against subsequent
purchasers. 205 For example, in Davidson & Associates v. Jung, the Eighth
Circuit determined that a license agreement bound subsequent purchasers
206
of software. This created a paradox: Although purchasers had a right to
reverse-engineer the software for interoperability reasons, they were not
permitted to see the program unless they agreed to give up that right.20
7
Perhaps the similarities lie elsewhere, such as in Article 2's search-
friendly set of rules. Software is text; as such, the line between purchasing
the right to use different components ("modules") of software, and
208purchasing the software itself, is razor-thin. Thus, sales of software blend
different categories of search because contract terms and features largely are
209interchangeable. Suppose you seek to purchase and download Microsoft
Office. You can select each of the modules (PowerPoint, Excel, etc.) for
separate purchase, or you can purchase the software as a whole. The act of
searching for the specific software components is tantamount to searching
210for the specific licenses you wish to purchase.
Similarly, the license is integrated with the software.2  Suppose a person
purchases a single personal copy of software. That software is enabled to run
on a single computer. Now suppose the buyer purchases a site license that
enables all computers at a single location to run the software. The license is
a feature of the software, and the software is plugged into the license.
204. See, e.g., Wikipedia, Client-server, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client-server (last
visited Feb. 6, 2007) (defining client server).
205. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 642 (8th Cir. 2005) (construing a
software license as preventing subsequent users of software from playing online video game).
206. See id. at 640.
207. Id. at 640-42.
208. See Radin, supra note 51, at 1143 ("Computer programs are both text and machine.
They are text when considered as code statements, they are machines when considered as
devices for accomplishing a task.").
209. Id. at 1144. Radin discusses this interchange ability:
The functionality that is supplied can be customized: for example, manufacturing
computers to order. Content (textual products) can also be customized, geared
toward the users' tastes or political views. In the same way, customization of terms
and conditions is possible. Instead of a take-it-or-leave-it set of fine print terms, a
website could offer a menu of choices for various clauses, and the user could check
boxes for which ones were desired. One might choose the warranty disclaimer
(free) or the two-year warranty (pay $1 extra); one might choose to accede to the
arbitration clause (free) or the clause allowing litigation in one's home state (pay
$2 extra).
Id.
210. Id. at 1139.
211. Id. ("In the 'contract as product' view, the contract is part of the product, part of the
collection of functional components, and not a separate text about that collection.").
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This phenomenon may explain why courts have opted to apply the law
of sales to the licensing of software. The core areas of law-licenses and
sales-have surprisingly little to do with one another, but the core concept
of lowering search costs where searches are the primary means of
contracting exists for both sales of goods and software. Thus, the gains from
using low-search-cost rules may outstrip the difficulties in applying the rules
governing sales of goods to the licensing of intellectual property.
As a counterexample, negotiations for customized software features are
infamous for cost overruns, failure, and eventual litigation." 2 For example,
companies that have extensive inventory-tracking systems or service-tracking
systems often contract with software vendors to have software systems written
to comport more closely with the precise needs of the company. These
contracts for the customization of software are notorious, in information-
technology circles, for failure.
Purchasers of software do not adequately budget for the development213
process. They often are unwilling to take advantage of cheap workarounds
by changing business practices instead of coding new systems into the
software. Similarly, purchasers often under-communicate critical
functionality, either because of a lack of knowledge as to what they should
communicate or because an indication of need may weaken bargaining
214positions with the software provider. Further, there is a particular puffing
problem with sales representatives. Since vendors can code custom software
to do anything, software salesmen can respond truthfully to nearly any
212. See, e.g., Olga Kharif, iRise: Real Promise in Simulations, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Feb. 2, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2005/tc2O0522-4709-tc024.htm.
213. See, e.g., James Bessen, Open Source Software: Free Provision of Complex Public
Goods 23 (July 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Iowa Law Review), http://www.
researchoninnovation.org/opensrc.pdf (noting that software "customers have highly disparate
needs" and software is complex).
214. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 387,
400 (1991). Ayres notes:
The potential inefficiency of signaling was eloquently captured by Dr. Seuss in his
parable about the Sneetches. High-status Sneetches had stars on their bellies and
low-status Sneetches did not. As the tale unfolds, vast inefficiencies are created as
the low-status Sneetches try to match the high-status ones by affixing stars to their
bellies and the high-status Sneetches try to further distinguish themselves by
removing their stars.
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question of proposed functionality.215 The answer to the common question
"can this software do X" is: "Yes-we can make it do X." 216
Thus, the field for negotiation is wide open. Given enough money, the
parties can have nearly anything they desire. Yet the failure rate of such
contracts is startling. The very openness of the negotiation set causes the
contracts for customization to fail. When purchasers of customized software
negotiate in an unconstrained environment, they make bad contracts-
contracts prone to failure and particularly susceptible to litigation because
the systems are often inventory or receivables systems critical to the
continuing operations of the company.
In sum, courts use Article 2, which normally governs the sale of goods,
to govern contracts licensing computer software because doing so enables
the majority of valuable contracts to be made with lower search costs. Search
theory provides a simple answer to what otherwise appears to be an ad hoc
series of problems in the sale of software-Article 2 governing software
licensure, and contracting for the customization of software failing at high
rates.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to show that the negotiation model of contract
does not provide a complete model of modern contracting' costs.
Contracting does not happen on an island. Rather, contracting is a
networked activity in which parties search the network for terms and
counterparties. The contractual language one party uses in her contracts
affects third-party costs; other contracting parties must now use or avoid the
term. The traditional focus on a closed universe of costs incurred by
contracting parties must therefore give way when parties form an enormous
number of contracts through offers and acceptances matched through
searched networks of offered contracts.
Viewing contract behavior through the lens of search also gives lawyers
tools to talk cogently about consent. Consent as a contractual doctrine has
become vestigial-as negotiation becomes a smaller part of contracting,
negotiated consent has become a largely mythological component of
contract. But the search lens of contract returns the conversation about
consent to relative simplicity. If the contract is search-optimized and if the
215. Distinctions between puffing and statements constituting express warranties are
notoriously difficult for courts to parse. Compare Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Moushon, 235
N.E.2d 263, 264-65 (I11. App. Ct. 1968) (holding that a statement that a product would please
the user was mere puffing), with Redmac, Inc. v. Computerland of Peoria, 489 N.E.2d 380, 382-
84 (I11. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that a statement that a product would arrive free of defect was
to be considered an express warranty).
216. For a more complete treatment of the role of engineer statements in litigation, see
generally Donovan Bezer, Your Programmer Promised It Would Work! How Software Engineers' Well-
Intentioned Statements Can Hurt When Their Employers Sue, 26 RUTGERS L. REc. 2 (2002).
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party has a meaningful opportunity to search for other counterparties, take-
it-or-leave-it bargains can produce meaningful consent.
Finally, a search-oriented theory of contract gives us a simple way to
understand the actual costs of modem contracting. Without this concept,
courts will continue to spend resources seeking to determine the negotiated
intent of the parties in non-negotiated contracts. Worse, parties will respond
to the incentives created by court decisions by either engaging in
negotiation where search would have been cheaper or avoiding searched
transactions where uncertainty is too high. With a search-oriented theory of
contract, on the other hand, courts can begin to adapt the common law to
modern contracting practices. For example, courts might begin to see
search-optimized contracts in a favorable light similar to that enjoyed by
specifically negotiated contracts. Courts may also change their views that
negotiation costs are bilateral and compensable, but search costs are
unilateral and non-compensable. Courts will hopefully begin to see searches
as bilateral through the process of search optimization-the searcher and
the search-optimizer groping toward some common ground through
searchable systems.
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